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This dissertation is an empirical investigation on the microeconomics of growth,
focusing on the role of shocks and on the formation of credit networks. It uses orig-
inal data, collected in Southern Ethiopia, an environment where nonlinear wealth
dynamics that are at the root of persistent poverty were previously identi¯ed.
The ¯rst chapter brie°y places this work in the wider context of the develop-
ment economics literature. The second chapter explores the causal mechanisms
behind the nonlinearities identi¯ed in earlier work. It focus on the role that not
only climatic shocks but also ability play in shaping di®erent accumulation pat-
terns. It is found that herders of low ability are expected to converge to a unique
dynamic equilibrium at a small herd size, while those with higher ability exhibit
multiple stable dynamic wealth equilibria.
The third chapter of this dissertation validates a new approach to the collection
of data on social relations that starts with a random sample of individuals and then
randomly samples from the prospective relationships among sample respondents.
Using original data from southern Ethiopia it is shown that this method yields
estimates of the structure of social relations that are statistically indistinguishable
from those generated by tracing respondents' local networks. Through the use
of Monte Carlo simulation, it is also shown that introducing this second level ofsampling improves the accuracy of the inference on the determinants of network
formation.
The last chapter explores the e®ect of herd dynamics on the formation of credit
networks. It ¯nds that the threshold at which wealth dynamics bifurcate serves
as a focal point at which credit transfers are concentrated and that asset loans
respond to recipients' losses as long as the recipients are not \too poor". These
results suggest that, when shocks can have long term e®ects, asset transfers may
aim to insure the permanent component of income generation, rather than the
transitory component, as it is commonly assumed. The chapter also shows that
the persistently poor are less likely to be known within their communities and less
likely to receive transfers in response to shocks.BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
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ixChapter 1
Introduction
Since Adam Smith, economics has focused on how to eliminate the poverty of na-
tions. That is also a central theme in the ¯eld of Development Economics, with
its focus on the recent experience of the less developed economies - those where
poverty is, even today, widespread. A valuable synthesis of this intellectual engage-
ment can be found, for example, in Lipton and Ravallion (1995). The breadth of
such review is notable: the authors cover the history of the ideas on the poor, how
to measure the extent of poverty, the characteristics of the poor and policy issues
related to anti-poverty interventions. What is conspicuously absent in analyzes of
poverty, even those dated as recently as the 1990s, is attention to questions such
as \Are the poor always the same?" and \What are the mechanisms that cause
poverty to persist?"
The empirical scrutiny of such questions has had to wait for the collection of
suitable longitudinal data. We know now that there are substantial movements
in and out of poverty (Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995, Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000,
Hoddinott, 2003), supporting the interpretation of poverty as a stochastic phe-
nomenon (Ravallion, 1988) and suggesting the distinction between transitory and
chronic poverty. Nevertheless, the mechanisms that explain why some people are
trapped in chronic poverty remain poorly understood.
The theoretical literature on this question has suggested several answers that
usually rely on the con°uence of two factors, technological indivisibilities and the
presence of some imperfection in the capital{market(for example, Loury, 1977,
1981, Dasgupta and Ray, 1986, Azariadis and Drazen, 1990, Galor and Zeira, 1993,
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Banerjee and Newman, 1993). Together, they prevent the poor from investing,
either through borrowing or through the gradual accumulation of assets.
There is a growing body of empirical evidence that checks the empirical validity
of these explanations. Uninsured risk plays a key role in this discussion, acting to
create or reinforce poverty in varied ways (Sinha and Lipton, 1999). One, more
easily measured and directly observable in the wake of any severe disaster, is the
destruction of individual wealth, either of the current generation (Dercon, 2004)
or of the next one (Jacoby and Skou¯as, 1997, Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey,
2006). Perhaps less noticeable, risk may induce the choice of safe but unpro¯table
productive strategies by those individuals who are not wealthy enough to self-insure
themselves from the potentially larger downside risk of more pro¯table livelihoods
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993, Morduch, 1995). Clearly, the two are not
separate as shown, for example, by Dercon (1998): in a risky environment, where
investing in livestock (an indivisible investment) is the activity with higher returns,
the wealth-di®erentiated capacity to deal with the e®ect of negative shocks leads
the poor to select less pro¯table strategies, reinforcing initial poverty. The same
point is made, with di®erent approaches, by Zimmerman and Carter (2003) and
by Elbers and Gunning (2003). The focus on \security" as one of the three pillars
of a strategy of poverty reduction, in the most recent World Development Report
devoted to poverty (World Bank, 2000), is perhaps the best expression of the
consensus around the importance of the theme.
Risk also plays a role in the character of poverty for conceptual reasons. The
same way that shocks can bring poverty to an ex ante wealthy individual, so can a
succession of good draws lead those who start poor into \happiness". In that sense,
initial poverty doesn't determine the ¯nal outcome or, in the words of Banerjee3
(2001, pp.30{31), \There are good reasons not to take poverty traps [models]
literally. The very lucky and the very talented among the poor will probably
manage to escape their background, and some of the rich will surely manage to
squander their patrimony. The robust implication of th[ese models] is rather that
economic mobility will be slow [(...) and, with non-convexities, it will] come from
those who are very talented or very lucky. In other words, it takes the form of
large jumps by a relatively few people".
As a consequence, and once one accepts that risk is a part of life, poverty traps
should not be checked by looking for the non-ergodicity of a dynamic system or,
in other words, for an absolute lack of mobility of the poor (as, for example, in
Easterly (2005)). This is why the identi¯cation of the mechanisms that slow the
investment of the poor, in particular its indivisibility and failures in the ¯nancial
markets, making poverty persist, is empirically important.
The identi¯cation of such mechanisms raises di®erent types of questions. The
¯rst one is where to start, that is, what to consider as \assets". In environments
(such as the one studied in this Dissertation) where people literally lived and died
depending on whether they had or not enough of one asset (as it happened in East
Africa with livestock (see Illife (1987) for the historical record on these societies),
the choice is clear. In other, more diversi¯ed, contexts this task is not so easy,
given that the mechanisms identi¯ed as possible sources of poverty persistence
range from malnutrition to environmental degradation and geographical isolation.
To this, one may add the possibility of fractal poverty traps, suggested by Easterly
(2000) and by Barrett and Swallow (2006), that the dynamics at one scale (the
region, for example) may in°uence the dynamics at another scale (the household,
for example).4
Together, they may rend inadequate a stricter focus on ¯nancial or productive
capital, even if augmented with human capital. However, a more encompassing
approach is not without problems. One is how to aggregate such di®erent assets
in one point in time. One possible solution, adopted by Barrett et al. (2006)
and Adato, Carter, and May (2006) is the construction of asset indexes, where
the appropriate aggregation weights are estimated through the relation between
assets and income. The second, related problem is how to interpret changes in a
composite index of assets, when each individual asset may have inherently di®erent
dynamics. This last point may be especially important if one admits the possibility
that those assets with slow dynamics may act as bifurcators of the dynamics of
the fast variables (Brock, 2001), in practice leading to the possibility of di®erent
accumulation paths and the formation of convergence clubs.
These di±culties have prompted a number of studies (recently reviewed by
Carter and Barrett (2006)) that search for nonlinearities in the dynamics assets
(or income), without necessarily exploring the mechanisms behind the identi¯ed
behavior. Central to this literature is the existence (or not) of multiple equilibria, in
particular the existence of a threshold at which accumulation dynamics bifurcate,
such that with wealth below such a critical level one is expected to slide into poverty
while, if above, one is expected to be able to accumulate more wealth. In spite of
the importance of such idea in the public debate (most recently, Sachs (2005)) the
empirical results have been mixed.1
1The lack of evidence on such thresholds may re°ect its inexistence, that is not
necessarily unexpected in diversi¯ed economies, with reasonably working safety
nets and capital{markets. In those cases, chronic poverty may be statistically
unimportant. It may, however, also re°ect the empirical di±culties in its identi¯-
cation, that stem both from the short duration of most of the longitudinal studies
from developing countries (that make the identi¯cation of di®erent growth rates
of income or assets for the same individual di±cult to impossible) and from the5
This dissertation, an investigation on the microeconomics of growth, focuses
on the role of shocks and on the decision process underlying the formation of
credit/insurance networks, through which the impact of shocks could be smoothed.
It uses original data, collected in Southern Ethiopia, an environment where previ-
ous work (Lybbert et al., 2004, Desta, 1999) identi¯ed the type of nonlinear wealth
dynamics that are conducive to make poverty a persistent phenomenon.
Although poverty is usually measured through income (or expenditure) data,
the approach adopted in this work is asset-based. The advantages of such an
approach to the analysis of poverty dynamics were recently summarized by Carter
and Barrett (2006). Among others, of central value is the direct relation to the
theoretic models of persistent poverty, which are built around the characteristics
of investment (namely, its indivisibility) and individual behavior (namely, the role
that access to credit and savings play in the accumulation process).
The next chapter explores the causal mechanisms behind the nonlinearities
identi¯ed in earlier work. In particular, it focus on the role that not only luck
(the climatic shocks that characterize this environment and make pastoralism the
central livelihood) but also ability play in shaping di®erent accumulation patterns,
echoing Banerjee's earlier{cited observation. We ¯nd that those with lower ability
are expected to converge to a unique dynamic equilibrium at a small herd size, while
those with higher ability exhibit multiple stable dynamic wealth equilibria. These
results underscore the criticality of asset protection against exogenous shocks in
order to facilitate wealth accumulation and economic growth and the importance of
incorporating indicators of ability in the targeting of asset transfers, as simulations
lack of data in the neighborhood of the accumulation threshold (a central predic-
tion of these models) that makes econometric inference harder, given the existing
techniques, as discussed at length in Barrett (2005).6
of alternative asset transfer designs demonstrate. They show also that pastoralists
perceive the nonlinear long{term dynamics that characterize livestock wealth in
the region.
More generally, this work suggests that wealth dynamics, even in a context
that seems a priori to be relatively simple (dependence on only one asset, char-
acterized by rapid biological accumulation and sensitivity to climate shocks), can
be extraordinarily complex. Focusing on the possibility of convergence clubs, that
take into account the di®erentiated role of speci¯c assets (in this case, only two {
livestock and \ability") may be a productive way of moving forward this area of
research, specially so in more diversi¯ed environments.
In the absence of formal credit or insurance markets, the task of coping with
the consequences of shocks falls to informal institutions. The study of such infor-
mal institutions is increasingly subsumed under the literature on \social capital".
Social capital has received considerable attention in the recent literature as a can-
didate mechanisms of growth at both the micro and macro levels (Durlauf and
Fafchamps, 2005). Despite that interest, and although \social capital is social
networks", empirical analysis of the formation of social networks, i.e., how people
accumulate such type of capital, remains quite limited.
One of the reasons, perhaps the central one, is the di±culty in collecting data
on social relationships. The third chapter of this dissertation validates a new ap-
proach to the collection of data on social relations that is easy to accommodate
with the usual sampling approaches of populations used by economists and other
social scientists. After reviewing the growing literature that uses social networks
as a method to analyze social context, paying special attention to how methods
of sampling data on relationships a®ect inference with respect to the formation of7
social networks, the chapter uses original data from southern Ethiopia to demon-
strate a new approach to collecting data on relationships. This new method starts
with a random sample of individuals and then randomly samples from the prospec-
tive relationships among sample respondents. It is shown that this method yields
estimates of the structure of social relations that are statistically indistinguishable
from those generated using more expensive and time{consuming methods that
trace respondents' social networks. Furthermore, and through the use of Monte
Carlo simulation, it tests the value of this approach and shows that introducing
this second level of sampling improves the accuracy of the inference on the deter-
minants of network formation.
Having established that pastoralists accurately perceive the underlying asset
dynamics that characterize their economic environment, and having validated a
methodology to collect the data on social networks, the last chapter ties these
two results through the analysis of the e®ect of herd dynamics on the formation
of credit networks that could potentially provide informal ¯nance against manage
climate shocks. It ¯nds that the threshold at which wealth dynamics bifurcate
serves as a focal point at which credit transfers are concentrated and that asset
loans respond to recipients' losses as long as the recipients are not \too poor".
These results suggest that, when shocks can have long term e®ects, asset transfers
may aim to insure the permanent component of income generation, rather than the
transitory component, as it is commonly assumed. The chapter also shows that
the persistently poor are less likely to be known within their communities and thus
less likely to receive transfers in response to shocks, further reinforcing the lack of
security of those who loose their assets.
As such, and more generally, this work also addresses concerns regarding the8
interactions between social networks, through which informal transfers °ow, and
public interventions. It shows that the possibility that public transfers may crowd
out informal ones is remote in this context and, on the contrary, appropriately
targeted interventions may even crowd in private transfers.Chapter 2
Heterogeneous wealth dynamics: on the
roles of risk and ability
2.1 Introduction
Contemporary policy debates are rife with discussion of \poverty traps".1 There
exist several theoretical models that combine some non-convex technology with
some market failure to explain why \the poor stay poor and the rich stay rich".2
But do poverty traps exist in the data? The empirical literature has mainly focused
on searching for a threshold e®ect associated with multiple dynamic equilibria in
the growth process, with one such equilibrium below a poverty line. The results
of such studies remain quite mixed, with some studies (e.g. Dercon, 1998, Lybbert
et al., 2004, Adato, Carter, and May, 2006, Barrett et al., 2006) ¯nding support
for the hypothesis while others (e.g. McKenzie and Woodru®, 2003, Lokshin and
Ravallion, 2004, Antman and McKenzie, 2005, Jalan and Ravallion, 2004), ¯nd no
evidence of such a threshold.
Nonlinear dynamics are sensitive to shocks that perturb their key variables. Not
only it is possible to use this feature to test for the presence of growth thresholds
(see Lokshin and Ravallion, 2004), but it is possible to conceive that a series of
good draws from the distribution of states of nature can move some fortunate
individuals above the threshold.3 One contribution of this paper is to emphasize
1See, for example, Sachs (2005) or United Nations Millenium Project (2005).
2See Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) or Bowles, Durlauf, and Ho® (2006) for
good reviews of the theoretical and early empirical literature on poverty traps.
3See Easterly et al. (1993) discussion of the e®ect of \good luck" on cross
country growth and the micro evidence on the e®ects of favorable co®ee price
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how negative shocks may generate nonlinear dynamics associated with persistent
poverty. In particular, we show that we only observe multiple dynamic wealth
equilibria among our subject population in adverse states of nature.
This paper will also argue that risk is not the only factor shaping wealth dy-
namics. As the empirical literature on macroeconomic growth suggests, we argue
that one needs to consider the possibility of \convergence clubs" based on intrin-
sic, unobservable characteristics such as time preferences, skills or disabilities.4
Perhaps the talented can more easily escape poverty or perhaps the disabled are
especially unlikely to do so, regardless of initial wealth. The role unobservable
ability plays in determining earnings has long been recognized in, for example,
studies of the private returns to education (Card, 1995) or in analysis of who be-
comes an entrepreneur (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). Nevertheless, we know of no
other study that explicitly considers the role of individual heterogeneity in shaping
wealth dynamics.
These two explanations, risk and ability, may be closely related. It may be that
all agents follow a path dynamic that converges towards a high-level equilibrium
when faced with favorable states of nature and that low-level equilibria only arise
because shocks routinely knock some backwards, before one's accumulated gains
become su±cient to provide adequate self-insurance (Dercon, 1998). In that case,
risk can be a source of persistent poverty not only because it induces ex ante
risk management that causes the poor to choose lower expected return portfolios
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993) but because di®erential ability to cope ex post
shocks on poverty in Uganda (Deininger and Okidi, 2003). See Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997) for a theoretic model where growth is ergodic but poverty can
persist.
4Baumol (1986), DeLong (1988) and Canova (2004) de¯ne and discuss the es-
timation of convergence clubs in macroeconomic growth data.11
with shocks may distinguish high performers from their less fortunate counterparts.
Thus, variation in welfare dynamics across states of nature may be central to
understanding how both individual-level characteristics and initial conditions a®ect
expected welfare dynamics.
Finally, the policy implications of the convergence club and threshold-based
multiple equilibria mechanisms di®er markedly. If poverty is a unique dynamic
equilibrium because of immutable individual characteristics, ongoing social trans-
fers may be the only available remedy for an unacceptably low standard of living.
But if poverty results from initial asset holdings insu±cient to clear a critical
minimum endowment threshold and thereby follow a positive accumulation path,
then asset transfers or changes to the productivity of existing assets can yield in-
creases in wealth that move bene¯ciaries onto a di®erent path dynamic, towards
a higher-level equilibrium, thereby diminishing the need for ongoing transfers. If
both processes are at play within a population, then e®ective targeting of appro-
priate interventions depends on identifying the relevant subpopulation to which a
given poor household belongs. Sorting out the (potentially multiple) mechanisms
that underpin persistent poverty is therefore enormously important in practical
terms, but also quite di±cult methodologically.
This paper explores these issues empirically. We unpack and extend the results
of Lybbert et al. (2004), who analyzed wealth dynamics among Boran pastoralists,
a poor population in southern Ethiopia. Cattle are the Borans major (in many
cases, the only non-human) asset and herd evolution is characterized by boom-
and-bust cycles determined by drought and biological reproduction. Using 17-year
herd history data, Lybbert et al. ¯nd herd dynamics that follow an S-shaped curve
with two stable dynamic equilibria (at roughly 1 and 35-40 cattle), separated12
by an unstable dynamic equilibrium, a threshold at 15-20 cattle. The authors
conjecture that this threshold results from a minimum critical herd size necessary
to undertake migratory herding to deal with spatiotemporal variability in forage
and water availability. Those with smaller herds are forced to stay near their base
camps, where pasture conditions soon get degraded, leading to a collapse of herd
size towards the low-level stable equilibrium, while those with bigger herds can
migrate in search of adequate water and pasture, enabling them to sustain far
larger herds. We collected new data among the same population so as to explore
the role of shocks and household-speci¯c ability in shaping wealth dynamics.
The next section brie°y explains the data. In section 2.3, we use data on pas-
toralists' expectations of herd size one year ahead, given di®erent values of initial
herd size, to simulate long-run equilibria that correspond closely with those identi-
¯ed in Lybbert et al. (2004). Pastoralists appear to perceive the dynamics re°ected
in herd history data. We disaggregate these dynamics as a function of respondents'
expected rainfall states and ¯nd that multiple equilibria arise exclusively in ad-
verse states of nature. Under favorable rainfall regimes, respondents' subjective
perceptions suggest a smooth asset growth process towards a unique, high-level
dynamic equilibrium. Given manifest variation in expected herd dynamics under
adverse states of nature, section 2.4 explores the hypothesis that herder-speci¯c
ability, which we derive using stochastic frontier estimation methods, conditions
wealth dynamics. This appears true in both the herders' expectations data and
in herd history data. In Section 2.5 we apply this approach to the analysis of
the (expected) evolution of the wealth of a sample of herders in this region. We
¯nd evidence that the incorporation of ability does make a di®erence in terms of
expected wealth and inequality in this system. Section 2.6 concludes, stressing the13
policy implications of these ¯ndings with respect to complex wealth dynamics and
the centrality of shocks and individual ability to understanding the existence of
multiple equilibria in this system.
2.2 Data
We employ three data sets. The ¯rst is that used by Lybbert et al. (2004), originally
collected by and described in Desta (1999), re°ecting 17 years of herd histories
for 55 Boran pastoralist households drawn from four communities (woredas) in
southern Ethiopia (Arero, Mega, Negelle and Yabello). Because 16 of the sample
households were formed within the 17 year period, this is an uneven panel of data,
with 833 total observations. The data were collected using a strati¯ed random
sampling design, using detailed interviews held with entire extended families whose
collective recall permitted the construction of reliable panel data on herd histories,
including mortality, marketing, gifts and loans, slaughtering and calving.5
The second consists of household survey data collected from 120 randomly
selected Boran pastoralist households in the same four communities of southern
Ethiopia, although the respondent households di®er from those Desta surveyed.
These data were collected every three months, March 2000-June 2002, and then
annually each September-October starting in 2003.6 The data include rich detail
on household composition, educational attainment,migration histories, changes in
herds, shocks, etc.
The third data set consists of subjective expectations of herd dynamics we
5Prior studies have con¯rmed the reliability of herd history recall data collected
among African pastoralists (Grandin, 1983, Assefa, 1990, Ensminger, 1992).
6The data were collected by the Pastoral Risk Management (PARIMA) project
of the USAID Global Livestock Collaborative Research Support Program. Barrett
et al. (2004) describe the location, survey methods and available variables.14
elicited from the PARIMA survey households in 2004. The use of elicited expecta-
tions to study decision-making was recently reviewed by Manski (2004). Although
the e±cacy of elicited expectations for testing economic hypotheses has been well
established, most such studies have taken place in high-income countries. Impor-
tant exceptions are Delavande (2004) on the e±cacy of contraceptive methods in
Ghana, and Luseno et al. (2003) and Lybbert et al. (2006) on pastoralists' rainfall
expectations in East Africa. Given the paucity of studies of low-income country
respondents' subjective expectations, it is worth explaining in some detail how we
elicited these data.
We started by randomly selecting four hypothetical initial herd sizes for each
respondent, one from each of the intervals de¯ned by the equilibria identi¯ed by
Lybbert et al. (2004).7 Respondents were then asked their expectations for rainfall
next year (choosing between good, normal or bad 8) and to assume a cattle herd
of standard composition for the region (in terms of age and sex of the animals).
After thus framing the problem, we asked each respondent to de¯ne the maximum
and the minimum herd size they would expect to have one year later if they
themselves started the year with the randomly assigned initial herd size. These
bounds provide a natural anchor for the next step, in which we asked respondents
to distribute, on a board, 20 stones among herd sizes between the minimum and
the maximum previously elicited, thereby describing their subjective herd size
distribution one year ahead conditional on the randomly assigned initial herd size.
7The intervals are [1,5), [5, 15), [15, 40) and [40, 60].
8Published rainfall forecasts, such as those disseminated by the regional
Drought Monitoring Centre and government and nongovernmental organization
extension o±cers, use precisely this sort of trinomial rainfall forecast, so it is fa-
miliar to respondents (Luseno et al., 2003, Lybbert et al., 2006). The data were
collected well into the rainy season, hence these are not uninformed priors.15
Finally, each respondent was asked if s/he had ever managed a herd approximately
equal in size to the initial value provided as the random seed. The elicitation
of the probability distribution function is an appropriate technique under these
circumstances (Morgan and Henrion, 1990) and allows us to compute conditional
distributions and their moments.
2.3 Expected herd dynamics in a stochastic environment
Figure 2.1 presents the scatter plot and kernel regression9 relating expected herd
size one year ahead and initial herd size, conditional on ever having had a herd
with a similar size for our sample of 285 observations.10 The solid 45± line from the
origin represents the dynamic equilibria where herd sizes are equal across periods.
Three points emerge immediately from comparing pastoralists' subjective expec-
tations of one year-ahead herd dynamics (¯gure 2.1) with the dynamics revealed
by Desta/Lybbert et al.'s herd history data (the dashed line in ¯gure 2.2).
First, both exhibit multiple dynamic equilibria consistent with the notion of
a poverty trap. Second, however, the equilibria identi¯ed by pastoralists appear
to di®er markedly from those apparent in herd history data, both with respect to
9We use the Nadaraya-Watson nonparametric regression, with the Epanech-
nikov kernel and bandwidth of 4.545. The value of bandwidth was selected using
Silverman (1986) rule of thumb, as determined by the \bounds for Stata" package
(Beresteanu and Manski, 2000). We apply the same bandwidth choice procedure
in the remainder of this paper, unless otherwise noted.
1023 of the 464 total observations (116 respondents with four di®erent starting
values each) do not include a herd size prediction, either because respondents
were unwilling to make predictions about rainfall or because they were unable
to distribute the stones across the board. The latter problem occurred mainly
for bigger initial herd sizes, when the di®erence between the maximum and the
minimum was sometimes quite large. Of the remaining 441 observations, in 285
cases (64.6%) the respondents had prior personal experience managing a herd of
comparable size.16




















































Figure 2.1: Herd dynamics based on respondent expectations
their location and stability. Notably, herd accumulation occurs for a wider range
of initial herd sizes, while herd losses seem a relatively marginal occurrence. This
would seem to suggest a di®erent story from the one described by herd history data
and detailed studies of the system (Coppock, 1994). Finally, there is considerable
dispersion in pastoralists' expectations of herd dynamics conditional on a given
starting herd size. If one interprets this variation as re°ecting pastoralist-speci¯c
herding abilities assuming each pastoralist accurately perceives his or her own
herd dynamics given his or her individual aptitude for herding then this suggests
that ability plays a signi¯cant role in wealth dynamics.
These casual comparisons invite more careful analysis, especially as regards the17
Figure 2.2: Herd dynamics based on herd history
intersection of rainfall conditions and herder ability. The pattern exhibited in the
actual herd history data (¯gure 2.2) is the result of a mixture of environmental
conditions over a period of 17 years.11 Meanwhile, the data on herders' subjective
assessments of herd dynamics (Figure 2.1) represent only the year-ahead expecta-
tion under necessarily more limited rainfall variability regimes. Put di®erently, the
dashed line in ¯gure 2 re°ects herd dynamics conditional on rainfall across a varied
mixture of states of nature while ¯gure 2.1 re°ects the union of the conditional
dynamics with a more limited mixing. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 disaggregate herders'
subjective herd dynamics, now conditioning on rainfall expectations.
11For example, Kamara, Swallow, and Kirk (2004) identify three major droughts
(1984/85, 1991/92 and 1995/96) and two periods of excessive rains (1980/81 and
1997/98) in this region over the period covered by the Desta/Lybbert et al. data.
To these natural disasters, one may add the generalized ethnic clashes between the
Boran and the Gabra in 1992, following the fall of the Derg regime.18



















































Figure 2.3: Expected herd dynamics under bad rainfall conditions
The di®erence is striking. The relation between expected and initial herd size is
nonlinear and suggests multiple equilibria only in the case of bad rainfall conditions.
Under good or normal climatic conditions (and perhaps unsurprisingly), herders
expect herds to grow no matter the initial herd size. The dispersion around the
expected values is also much bigger under conditions of bad rainfall than in a good
or normal year. Herders exhibit far more heterogeneous beliefs about their ability
to deal with adverse states of nature than with favorable ones. If we are correct
in attributing this feature of the data to individual ability, then such di®erences
seem to matter most when times are tough.
In order to simulate pastoralists' long run expectations of herd dynamics, we
need data on the expected behavior under more extreme conditions, namely severe
drought and very good years. To obtain such information, we used a second19




















































Figure 2.4: Expected herd dynamics under good rainfall conditions
questionnaire similar to the one described above except that we de¯ned rainfall
conditions in advance. 12 This instrument was ¯elded in only one of the four sites
(Dida Hara). The results largely correspond with those already reported, showing
an almost linear relation between expected and initial herd sizes in very good years
and a highly nonlinear relation in cases of severe drought.13
In order to generate herders' subjective expectations of herd dynamics under
a mixture of states of nature corresponding to the solid line in ¯gure 2, depicting
ten year herd transitions in the Desta/Lybbert et al. data we need to integrate
12In particular, we asked respondents to consider herd evolution \as if" in 1999,
the last major drought, or \as if" in a very good year, which we asked them to
de¯ne based on their own experience.
13To conserve space, we omit graphics re°ecting these data and nonparametric
regressions, although plots corresponding to Figure2.1 and Figures 2.3 and 2.4 are
available upon request.20
information on herd growth expectations conditional on rainfall (the elicited ex-
pectations data previously described) with historical information on rainfall data
(in practice, monthly rainfall data for the 4 sites over the period 1991-2001).14
With this information we can then simulate herd evolution over longer periods
using. Since we must predict out-of-sample in simulating herd evolution for large
values of initial herd size, we had to estimate the parametric relation between ini-
tial and expected herd sizes (hereafter, herd1 and herd0, respectively). Conditional
on each of the four rainfall scenarios (drought, poor rainfall, normal/good rainfall,
very good), we estimate this relation with a respondent ¯xed e®ect speci¯cation,
®i, taking advantage of having repeated observations, r, across di®erent herd size
intervals on each individual. We thus estimate
h1 ir = f(h0 ir) + ®i + ²ir (2.1)
where f(h0 ir) is a polynomial function of initial herd size.15
Table 2.1 presents the estimates, which re°ect the results displayed visually in
¯gures 2.3 and 2.4: unambiguous, e®ectively linear expected growth under nor-
mal/good/very good rainfall conditions, but a nonlinear estimated relation be-
tween herd1 and herd0 only under conditions of poor rainfall (and drought), and
14Average rainfall was 490 mm/year, with a standard deviation of 152 mm/year.
Given the skewness and the kurtosis of this distribution, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that rainfall follows a normal distribution. The minimum annual
rainfall over the period was registered in 1999 (259 mm) and the maximum in 1997
(765 mm). The probability of such events is 0.064 and 0.035. Given these results,
we assumed, for simulation purposes, a symmetric distribution, with a probability
of extreme events (drought; or very good year) equal to 0.10.
15Besides the assumptions on the functional form of f(²), we also assumed that
²ir » N(0,¾2). Other speci¯cations, that replace the ¯xed e®ect with other regressors
that could a®ect subjective expectations, such as gender, age, experience and migrant
status, were considered, but none of those variables proved statistically signi¯cant, so we
omit these results, which are available upon request. We omit higher order polynomial
terms in the very good and good/normal year speci¯cations because they added nothing
given the good ¯t already achieved with a simple linear speci¯cation with ¯xed e®ects.21
Table 2.1: Estimates of Expected Herd Dynamics Conditional on Rainfall
Variable Very Good Good Bad Very bad
herd0 1.293 1.477 0.528 0.246







constant 0.897 0.179 0.513 -0.575
[0.448] [0.416] [1.185] [1.083]
Number of observations 61 96 192 61
R2 0.986 0.994 0.792 0.589
with considerable dispersion so that the precision of those estimates is far less than
under favorable rainfall regimes. We then use these estimation results to simulate
the expected evolution of herd sizes, properly calibrated to impose basic biologi-
cal rules for livestock.16 Figure 2.5 presents the basic structure of the simulation
procedure we used.
t-1 t t+1
predict herdt ! rainfall draw
(herd0 given) #
call ht+1=f(ht j rainfall )
#
predict ht+1 ! repeat as in t
Figure 2.5: Scheme of simulation procedure
16More precisely, we do not allow for negative herds and impose that biological
growth under good rainfall conditions is delayed in 2 years, i.e., enough for cows
toreproduce. We also constrain the predicted values for initial herd sizes above
52 (poor rainfall) and 45 (drought) to be linear, with a slope of 0.03309 and
0.00913, preventing unbelievable predictions due to the parameter estimates at
the boundaries of our sample.22
Figure 2.6 presents the mean of 10-year ahead herd size for 500 replicates of this
simulation with initial herd sizes between 1 and 60. The results are remarkably
similar to the dynamics revealed by the herd history data (solid line in ¯gure 2),
both in the general shape of the curve and in the location of the di®erent equilib-
ria. While the one year ahead transitions predicted by the two data sets (¯gure
2.1 and the dashed line in ¯gure 2) did not match because of the fundamentally
di®erent underlying states of nature, once one takes into account historical rainfall
patterns and simulates the longer-term, decadal herd dynamics, it appears that
Boran pastoralists have a remarkably accurate understanding of the nature of how
their herds evolve. In particular, they expect that someone with a herd below
approximately 15 cattle will eventually lose his wealth, collapsing into a destitute
equilibrium with 1 animal.















































Figure 2.6: Simulated expected herd dynamics { all observations pooled23
Can we be sure that multiple equilibria exist? The answer is \no"; the lower
con¯dence band crosses the equilibrium line only once, from above, at the lower
level equilibrium (1 animal). But as we show below, this merely re°ects our current
assumption that all herders follow the same growth path. Once we allow for the
possibility of convergence clubs, the di®erentiated results become clearer.
Concentrating on our average estimates, do these nonlinearities lead to a poverty
trap? The answer depends, in part, on what one means by a \poverty trap". In
Table 2.2 we quantify the probability of moving between equilibria in a 10 year
period given the stochastic nature of these shocks. There is a positive probability
that a herder starting with a herd between 1 and 4 cattle will, 10 years later, have
grown his herd. Indeed, he may even be above the accumulation threshold. The
strictest interpretation of a poverty trap that initial conditions totally determine
future wealth and the system is non-ergodic (and thus the probability of growing
is zero) ¯nds no support in our data. However, the probability of moving out of
poverty is quite low (less than 12%), suggesting that, in this context, the idea of a
poverty trap is better associated with a high probability (but not certainty) that
agents will remain at lower levels of welfare, a weaker but perhaps more realistic
interpretation of the concept, especially in stochastic environments (Azariadis and
Stachurski, 2005).
Figure 2.7 synthesizes the discussion thus far by presenting the limiting dis-
tribution of this stochastic process. The system spends most of its time (78.9 %)
with herd sizes below 4 cattle, a consequence of the asymmetric e®ects of rainfall
conditions: the large losses su®ered in periods of drought can only be fully com-
pensated by a series of years of good rainfall.17 With such a small probability of
17It is possible that this behavior re°ects an underestimate of the true probability
of remaining in the high welfare equilibrium identi¯ed by Lybbert et al. (2004), as24
Table 2.2: Herd size transition matrix (10 year period)
herdt+10 0-4 5-14 15-39 >40
herdt
1-4 0.879 0.113 0.009 0.000
5-14 0.575 0.262 0.133 0.030
15-39 0.204 0.280 0.255 0.261
>40 0.136 0.230 0.291 0.342
being at the high welfare equilibrium (around 2%), compounded by the fact that
such equilibrium is here de¯ned as the residual interval of \herds larger than 40
cattle", we get a picture of a slow slide into generalized poverty that corresponds
with others' description of the system (Coppock, 1994).
Summarizing the results so far, we ¯nd that Boran pastoralists accurately per-
ceive long-term herd dynamics characterized by multiple wealth equilibria con-
sistent with the notion of a poverty trap: shocks almost totally prevent wealth
accumulation that would allow those herders at a low level of welfare from escap-
ing poverty. However, these dynamics seem entirely the result of an asymmetry
in growth rates under di®erent rainfall conditions. Growth is universally expected
in good years while S-shaped dynamics seem to result from wealth-di®erentiated
capacity to deal with bad rainfall conditions.18
a consequence of our assumptions regarding herd dynamics outside the range of
data for which we have information. Recall that we assumed that, for herd sizes
above a certain value and for conditions of poor rainfall or drought, growth rates
were a linear function of initial herd size. As we show below, it is possible that
that is not the case.
18This could explain why, for example, Mogues (2004) studying livestock accu-
mulation in other regions of Ethiopia in the period 2000-03, with no major shocks
in between, does not ¯nd evidence of such nonlinearities, and why Barrett et al.
(2006) ¯nd evidence of an S-shaped curve for asset dynamics in the northern Kenya25




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4 Ability and expected herd dynamics
Herding is a di±cult livelihood. One must know how to treat livestock diseases
and injuries, protect cattle against predators, manage their nutrition, navigate to
distant grazing and watering sites, assist in di±cult calving episodes, etc. Not
everyone learns and practices these diverse skills equally well. One would natu-
rally expect more skilled herders to enjoy faster herd growth and to be less subject
to adverse shocks to herd size than less skilled herders. Put di®erently, the herd
dynamics explored in Lybbert et al. (2004) and in the previous section may ignore
salient di®erences in herder ability. We explore the impact of di®erences in herd-
ing ability upon herd dynamics by using the PARIMA panel data on pastoralist
households to estimate herder ability using stochastic parametric frontier estima-
tion methods for panel data (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). More precisely, we
estimate the herd growth frontier conditional on household attributes and initial
period herd size using a composed error term that includes a symmetric random
component re°ecting standard sampling and measurement error, Ã, and a one-sided
term re°ecting observation-speci¯c but time invariant ine±ciency, Á ¸0, which we
assume follows a truncated normal distribution, N+(¹;¾2):
hit = f(hit¡1) + ¯Xit¡1 ¡ Ái + Ãit (2.2)
Since these households have been surveyed since 2000, we can take advantage of
multiple observations for each herder to compute consistent herder-speci¯c mean
e±ciency measures, i.e., each pastoralist's proximity to the herd growth frontier
that provide at least a coarse proxy for herder-speci¯c ability that is not otherwise
directly observable. Table 2.3 presents estimates of the herd growth frontier based
on 2000-1, 2001-2 and 2002-3 annual observations for the 113 households for which27
we have complete data on each of the covariates.19 Table 2.4 de¯nes these variables
and presents the descriptive statistics.
Table 2.3: Stochastic parametric herd growth frontier estimates
Variable Coe±cient Std. Err. P-value
herd size at t-1 £ above threshold 1.022 0.093 0.000
herd size at t-1 squared £ above threshold 0.000 0.001 0.689
herd size at t-1 £ below threshold 0.890 0.307 0.004
herd size at t-1 squared £ below threshold -0.009 0.022 0.681
no cattle at t-1 -1.126 1.245 0.366
labor £ above threshold -0.089 0.174 0.611
labor £ below threshold 0.099 0.125 0.427
land 0.022 0.152 0.885
sex 1.333 0.702 0.057
experience 0.137 0.071 0.052
experience squared -0.002 0.001 0.174
migrant -0.605 0.998 0.544
2000-01 -0.740 0.531 0.164
2001-02 1.553 0.525 0.003
Dida Hara 1.870 1.110 0.092
Qorate 0.026 1.229 0.983
Wachille 0.827 1.131 0.465





Á/ ¾2 0.229 0.104
Number of observations 338
Log-likelihood -967.766
Notice that we use an exogenous switching regressions formulation to incor-
porate the possibility of two di®erent growth paths, depending on whether the
herder is above or below the 15 cattle threshold identi¯ed by Lybbert et al. (2004).
The results indicate statistically signi¯cant (p-value = 0.053) di®erences in the
asset dynamics above and below the threshold, with expected herd growth (col-
lapse) above (below) the threshold. The estimated frontier is piecewise quadratic
19Because one of the households is the successor of an initial household, we only

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in herdt-herdt¡1 space, as higher order polynomial terms of lagged herd size have
no statistically signi¯cant e®ect.20 Household labor and land endowments have no
e®ect at the margin on expected herd growth, signaling that these are not limiting
in this environment for most households. Male-headed households enjoy signi¯-
cantly higher herd growth rates, which may partly capture household composition
e®ects (with male-headed households having more men able to herd, holding la-
bor availability constant). There exist statistically signi¯cant, albeit diminishing,
marginal returns to herding experience. And there are marginally signi¯cant ¯xed
e®ects associated with location and year (for 2001-2, the year of recovery after the
severe 1999-2000 drought), the latter result reinforcing our earlier ¯nding about
state-dependent growth.
Using the predicted value of each herder's estimated technical ine±ciency, we
then divide our sample into two sub-samples: lower ability (those in the 4th quar-
tile of the ine±ciency estimates, above 15.38) and a complementary category of
higher ability herders. The distribution of the ine±ciency estimates (with cattle
as the units) is presented in ¯gure 2.8,21 allowing a visual analysis of the diver-
sity within each sub-sample. The observations are concentrated within a limited
range of ine±ciency estimates, suggesting that there may be little value to further
20We also ran this regression using cubic and quartic terms, but none of the
higher-order polynomials were statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero and
one could not reject the null hypothesis that the higher-order terms jointly have
no e®ect on next periods herd size, once one allows for the threshold e®ect. The
variable \no cattle at t-1" is included to control for the fact that the biology of herd
growth is di®erent when one has no cattle growth can then only occur through
purchases or gifts, both of which are very infrequent (Lybbert et al., 2004) than
when one has a positive herd size. Although the point estimate on this variable
is statistically insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero, when we do not control for this
e®ect, the estimated coe±cients on lagged herd size and its various interactions
become far more imprecise.
21Estimated using the Epanechnikov kernel, with a bandwidth of 0.24697.30
subdivision of the sample.22




















Figure 2.8: Empirical density function of ine±ciency estimates
For each of these classes we re-estimated equation 2.1, obtaining estimates of
the parametric models that relate expected and initial herd size for each sub-
sample.23 After calibration of these models we performed the same simulations
as above. Figure 4.1 shows the mean of 10-year-ahead herd size obtained for 500
replicates with initial herd sizes between 1 and 60 for each ability class. The results
22In an earlier version of this paper, we did experiment with splitting the higher
ability herders into two categories, those of highest ability (the 1st quartile of
the ine±ciency distribution) and a residual medium ability class (the 2nd and 3rd
quartiles). The qualitative results are similar, so we present the simpler approach.
23These 8 parametric models (4 states of nature £ 2 ability classes) are qualita-
tively similar to the ones presented in Table 2.1. To conserve space, we omit them
here.31
are easily summarized.
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Figure 2.9: Simulated expected herd dynamics { the e®ect of ability
Although those in the lowest ability quartile exhibit S-shaped expected herd
dynamics, these lie everywhere beneath the dynamic equilibrium line (the solid 45 ±
line in ¯gure 4.1). Thus, low ability herders are expected to converge towards the
low level dynamic asset equilibrium of 1 or 2 head of cattle, just as Lybbert et al.
(2004) found unconditional on ability. Higher ability herders likewise exhibit S-
shaped expected herd dynamics. However, they face multiple dynamic equilibria,
with a threshold (i.e., unstable dynamic equilibrium) at 12-17 cattle, similar to the
threshold Lybbert et al. (2004) estimated in the herd history data. Notice also that,
when we allow for di®erent growth paths conditional on ability, we get much more32
precise estimates of the dynamics of this system. In particular, both con¯dence
bands cross the equilibrium line in three intervals, two of which represent stable
equilibria. The implication, re°ected in ¯gure 4.1, is that S-shaped herd dynamics
characteristic of a poverty trap are not followed by all herders. In particular, low
ability herders face a unique dynamic equilibrium at lower levels of welfare, giving
rise to a di®erent sort of poverty trap than that faced by herders with higher
ability, who expect to accumulate wealth so long as they start with an adequate
herd size. Figure 2.10 presents the limiting distributions of the wealth transitions
for the two ability groups, reinforcing this point. Herders of higher ability enjoy a
probability of holding herds above 55 cattle that is almost 5 times that for herders
of lower ability.
These results clearly raise important practical questions with respect to any
asset redistribution or transfer policy, as ability is not easily established, at least
not by outsiders such as the governmental and nongovernmental agencies that
typically provide transfers and public safety net programs.24 Because of these
critical policy implications, we sought to con¯rm this last result in the herd history
data used by Lybbert et al. (2004). As before, we do that in two steps. First, we
estimate a stochastic growth frontier, following equation 2.2, to obtain estimates of
herder-speci¯c, time-invariant ine±ciency relative to the estimated growth frontier,
and interpret these ine±ciency estimates as a measurement of unobserved ability.
Given the longer panel, here we use ten year transitions, rather than the annual
transitions estimated in the more detailed PARIMA data. But the limited variables
in this dataset restrict the controls we can include to site ¯xed e®ects and the
number, in the previous decade, of years of bad rainfall and of good rainfall. As a
24Santos and Barrett (2007a) explore the e®ects of ability and multiple equilibria
on private, interhousehold transfers among these pastoralist households.33





















Figure 2.10: Limiting distribution - the e®ect of ability
consequence the interpretation of estimated ine±ciency as ability is considerably
less clear than in our previous results. Nevertheless, as a check on the robustness
of the previous result, we think it is useful. Finally, because we are interested
in comparing our results with the ones from the previous section, we restrict the
estimation of this e±ciency frontier to herd sizes within the same range as found in
the PARIMA data, below 100 cattle. 25 Table 2.5 presents the estimation results.
The ¯rst observation concerns the statistical insigni¯cance of the explanatory
variables. The e®ect of past herd sizes (here, with a lag of 10 years) is better
25The smaller maximum herd sizes in the PARIMA data than in the
Desta/Lybbert data re°ect declining median herd sizes as well, re°ecting what
most observers perceive as deepening poverty in the region.34
Table 2.5: Stochastic parametric herd growth frontier estimates
Variable Coe±cient Std. Err. p{value
herdt¡10 0.141 0.501 0.779
herdt¡10 squared 0.001 0.011 0.914
herdt¡10 cubed -0.000 0.000 0.985
good rainfall 0.005 0.005 0.997
bad rainfall -1.907 1.416 0.178
Mega 0.613 13.239 0.963
Arero -5.009 13.632 0.713
Negelle -13.120 12.511 0.294





Á / ¾2 0.869 0.032
Number of observations 236
Log Likelihood -972.643
expressed through a cubic function and we cannot ¯nd evidence of a threshold at
an initial herd size of 15 cattle, as we found in the PARIMA data analyzed above.
These results can be explained both by the lack of detailed information on other
covariates available in the PARIMA data, the much longer lag being explained
and the overall di®erences between the two samples (for example, with respect to
average herd size: 68.5 cattle in this sample versus 14.7 in the PARIMA data).
As a consequence, not only are the ine±ciency terms clearly di®erent, they also
explain a much larger share of total variation (°=0.869 versus 0.229 in Table 2.3).
Figure 2.11 graphs the empirical density function.26
With these estimates of herder-speci¯c ability, we now explore the possibility
of heterogeneous wealth dynamics within this sample using regression trees. This
approach was used by Durlauf and Jonhson (1995) and more recently by Tan
(2005) to study economic growth in national-level data. Regression trees is a
non-parametric technique introduced by Breiman et al. (1984) that allows the
26Estimated using the Epanechnikov kernel, with a bandwidth of 6.9621.35






























































































































































































. 27 At each split, the
estimator de¯nes increasingly homogeneous subsets, without the need to determine
exogenously the threshold variables and values that mark such divisions. Given
the lack of theory on how to select such variables, this approach has the double
advantage of eliminating much of the arbitrariness in the analysis and of providing
results that are structurally interpretable, in the sense that they reveal the relative
importance of particular determinants of the relation being explained. Although
the results have been shown to be consistent Breiman et al. (1984), the limitation
27A very brief introduction to regression trees can also be found in Hardle (1990,
chapter 10.1).36
remains that there is no asymptotic theory to test the statistical signi¯cance of the
number of splits identi¯ed.28 In what follows we'll use the Generalized, Unbiased
Interaction Detection and Estimation (GUIDE) algorithm, explained brie°y in the
Appendix and at length in Loh (2002).The result of this procedure is the regression





































Figure 2.12: Regression tree: herd dynamics, ability and initial herd size
Empty circles indicate the splitting criteria while numbered circles represent
terminal nodes that contain di®erent subsamples. At each splitting point, the
tree indicates the threshold variable and its value. Observations with a value
smaller than the threshold value follow the left branch from the node; those with
a greater value follow the right branch. Consistent with our ¯ndings to this point,
28Other approaches, such as the use of mixture models (Bloom, Canning, and
Sevilla, 2003) can, in principle, overcome such problem but, given their computa-
tional cost, usually at the cost of reducing the number of admissible splits. Note
also that the validity of the theory underlying the identi¯cation of thresholds
through sample splitting proposed in Hansen (2000) is unclear when we consider
more than one split of the original sample, as noticed by the author (p.588).37
the ¯rst splitting variable is herder ability, which divides the sample into 164
observations on 24 lower ability herders (a much larger subsample than the lower
quartile we arbitrarily imposed earlier) and 70 observations on 21 higher ability
herders. Within the subsample of lower ability herders, there does not appear to
be any threshold in the herd growth function, consistent with our earlier ¯ndings
using other data from this region. Within the subsample of higher ability herders,
however, a further split occurs, at the relatively high herd size of 66 head of cattle.
The sample splitting generated by the regression trees method thus reinforces the
¯nding of a unique equilibrium for lower ability herders and multiple equilibria for
the rest.
Our estimates of the herd growth models associated with each terminal node
appear in Table 2.6 and are graphed in ¯gure 2.13.29Expected herd dynamics ap-
pear highly nonlinear in each regime. For the lower ability herders, however, the
unique dynamic equilibrium occurs at a herd size of zero, qualitatively consistent
with the earlier evidence of expected collapse into destitution. Interpretation of
the higher ability herders' expected wealth dynamics is somewhat complicated by
inevitable extreme behaviors in the tails of each subsample, due to the low-order
polynomial, parametric model being ¯tted. But this too is qualitatively quite sim-
ilar to our previous result. In particular, there appear multiple stable equilbria,
in this case at 18-20 animals and around the sample splitting point of 66 head for
those within the range of herd sizes comparable to our earlier results.
29The (perhaps counter-intuitive) lack of smoothness of these growth paths is
a general result of the regression trees approach, given that splitting the data
implicitly assumes that small changes in one variable lead to signi¯cant changes in
behavior.38
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2.5 Expected growth and inequality among the Boran
We now apply this simulation approach to analyze the expected evolution of wealth
and inequality in our sample of respondents. We use the same approach as above
on the subsample of 97 households that had cattle in 2003.30 Table 2.7 presents the
results for expected average herd size 10 years ahead and for expected inequality,
based on 500 runs of our simulation procedure, ¯rst when we disregard the e®ect
of herder ability (column b), then when we incorporate it (column c).31
The results are simple to interpret. When we take into consideration the role
individual heterogeneity plays in shaping wealth dynamics, we should expect both
an increase in average herd size and a large increase in inequality over time, as low
ability herders collapse into destitution. If we simulate the evolution of the wealth
of this population with a simpler approach that neglects such di®erences, then still
expect an increase in inequality (although somewhat smaller), but with a decrease
in average wealth.
Finally, we explore the e®ectiveness of herd restocking in this system, as this is
perhaps the most common form of post-drought assistance provided to pastoralists
by donors and governments in the region. We simulate the e®ect of three di®erent
scenarios. In Scenario 1, all herds below 5 cattle (the Boran-de¯ned poverty line)
30From our sample of 120 respondents, 5 were not interviewed in 2003 and 18 had
no cattle. Given that we did not elicited the expectations about herd evolution
for this situation and that, to the best of our knowledge, there are no reliable
estimates of the rate of re-entry into pastoralism for herders who lost all their
cattle, we dropped them from the simulation. Among those with no cattle in 2003,
5 households (or 27%) were classi¯ed as of being of low ability.
31Values in column (a) are for the 97 respondents in the PARIMA sample that
had cattle in 2003. Values in columns (b) and (c) are the expected value of the sta-
tistics based on 500 replicates of our simulation procedure. Values within parenthe-
ses are standard errors. The standard error for the Gini coe±cient was computed
using the algorithm described in Karagiannis and Kovacevic (2000).41
Table 2.7: Expected evolution of wealth and inequality among the Boran,
2003 2013 2013
(disregarding ability) (considering ability)
(a) (b) (c)
Average herd size 12.76 10.47 14.59
(1.49) (3.59) (8.11)
Gini coe±cient 0.46 0.66 0.71
on herd size (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
are given animals to boost their herd to 5 head. In aggregate, that corresponds
to a transfer of 36 cattle to 17 bene¯ciaries. In Scenario 2, we simulate the ef-
fects of transferring (approximately) the same number of cattle so as to compare
mechanisms under a constant budget but now targeted not to the poorest ¯rst
but rather in order to maximize expected herd growth from the transfer, assuming
there exists no e®ective mechanism to elicit herder ability. Scenario 2 involves a
¯ctive transfer of 35 cattle to 13 bene¯ciaries. In Scenario 3, we assume one can
accurately identify herder by ability group and, as with Scenario 2, again target
transfers so as to maximize asset growth. Scenario 3 involves transfers of 37 cattle
to 16 high ability herders.
The main di®erence between these scenarios is evident in Figure 2.14, where
we draw the expected herd growth associated with the transfer of 1 cattle. Given
expected herd dynamics over the decade following the hypothesized transfer, the
transfer is expected to generate herd growth, net of the 1 cattle transfer, only
for recipients with ex ante herd size between 7 and 22 head. Those with the42

























Figure 2.14: Expected gains from the transfer of 1 cattle
smallest (or largest) herds are expected to lose some of their post-transfer herd
over the ensuing decade, signaling negative medium-to-long term growth returns
on livestock transfers to the poorest (or wealthiest) herders. The expected herd
gain is maximized for an ex ante herd size of 13 cattle, a signi¯cantly larger herd
than is typical of restocking program participants, since such interventions are
typically targeted following some wealth-sensitive process, like Scenario 1. Table
2.8 presents the results of a comparison among these three di®erent scenarios for
targeting herd restocking transfers.
As one would expect based on the growth dynamics in the system, restocking


























































promote growth among the poor. After 10 years, bene¯ciaries enjoy an expected
gain of 1.35 cattle, but from an average transfer of 2.12 cattle. This implies a -4.4%
compound annual return on investment in transfer resources, given expected herd
losses below the critical herd size threshold. The growth-promoting impacts of herd
restocking become more satisfactory in the other two scenarios. Under scenario
2, the average net returns to this policy after 10 years are 17% (1.6% annually).
These more than double, to 37% (3.3% annually), under scenario 3, showing that
the growth payo® to identi¯cation of a reliable mechanism for identifying herding
ability is potentially considerable since ability seems to matter a great deal to
wealth dynamics in this system.
2.6 Conclusions
Using unique data on household-level expectations of herd growth, collected through
innovative empirical methods for eliciting subjective herd growth distributions, we
¯nd that southern Ethiopian pastoralists appear to understand the nonstationary
herd dynamics that long-term herd history data suggest characterize their system,
corroborating Lybbert et al. (2004) results using di®erent data and methods. A
poverty trap indeed seems to exist. Moreover, their responses enable us to unpack
the herd history data, revealing that multiple dynamic equilibria arise purely due
to adverse shocks associated with low rainfall years and for pastoralists of higher
herding ability. Lower ability herders appear to converge towards a unique, low-
level equilibrium herd size. Thus, the data suggest that even among a seemingly
homogeneous population in an ethnically uniform region o®ering e®ectively only
one livelihood option livestock herding there exist complex wealth dynamics char-
acterized by distinct convergence clubs de¯ned by individual ability and multiple45
dynamic equilibria for only a subset of those clubs.
These ¯ndings carry two very general policy consequences. First, the need for
interventions to lift people out of or prevent their collapse into poverty traps,
seems to depend on the nature of the adverse shocks, in particular whether their
severity and frequency is such that growth under favorable states of nature is
often and sharply reversed, making accumulation below a critical threshold un-
likely, albeit not impossible. Risk mitigation to limit the frequency or magnitude
of shocks may be as or more valuable than transfers to facilitate growth among
the poorest. Second, the appropriate means of social protection in this stochastic
environment depend very much on individual characteristics, perhaps including
di±cult-to-observe characteristics such as ability. Identifying ability may be oper-
ationally di±cult, but failure to take such characteristics into account may lead to
ill-conceived e®orts and wasted scarce resources.Chapter 3
Understanding the formation of social
networks.
3.1 Introduction
A large and heterogeneous literature under the general label of social capital at-
tempts to quantify the value of social embeddedness in terms of welfare improve-
ments for households and individuals.1 The concept of a social network plays a
prominent motivational role, in that it is through the set of interpersonal links be-
tween individuals that the net bene¯ts of social interaction are assumed to °ow. In
the words of Robert Putnam, an in°uential author in this literature, \My de¯nition
is: social capital is networks".2
This conceptual emphasis has not been matched by the use of social networks
as a method to explore the e®ects of social context. Social capital has often been
measured through the quanti¯cation of the density of membership in voluntary
associations (sometimes referred to as \Putnam's instrument")3 while the related
literature on social interactions has largely followed a similar path, using easily
available information on community or group membership (ethnicity, gender, geo-
graphic neighborhood,etc.) to proxy for social networks. Although this has moved
the research on the importance of social context from \being a specialty for net-
work sociologists" (Paldam, 2000, pp.636-7) into what Durlauf (2002, p.459) calls
1The literature on social capital was recently reviewed by Durlauf and
Fafchamps (2005).
2Paldam (2000, p. 651, footnote 15).
3See, for example, Narayan and Pritchett (1997) for an early use of this type
of variable in development economics.
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\one of the most striking developments in social science over the last decade",
the blurring of the distinction did not help solving the inferential problems on the
analysis of social interactions initially pointed out by (Manski, 1993).4
It was the recognition of these problems and the need to have data on con-
crete interactions to overcome them (Manski, 2000) that led to the development,
within economics, of a much smaller literature where social networks is not only
a metaphor but also a method to characterize social context. The focus of this
paper is on the development economics literature that aims at understanding the
process underlying network formation, either as a question in itself or as a ¯rst
step towards the quanti¯cation of the instrumental value of social connections.
Social networks are a set of individuals and the relationships among them. This
joint focus is the source of di®erences from data collection strategies centered on
the characteristics of individuals alone.5 The relatively small literature that has
collected both types of data is, nevertheless, diverse. Development economists
have used a variety of sample designs, both for respondents (from census to ran-
dom sample) and for relationships (from a complete enumeration to the selection
of a pre-determined number of relations, from real to potential behavior). As
interest in the empirical analysis of social networks grows and more researchers
contemplate the possibility of collecting such data, it is important to understand
the implications of these methodological choices.6 That is the purpose of the next
4See also Brock and Durlauf (2001), Mo±tt (2001). Both Soetevent (2006) and
Blume and Durlauf (2005) present recent reviews of this literature
5This focus implies also that we consider only those studies where the charac-
teristics of relationships were elicited. We leave outside of this analysis studies such
as Bandiera and Rasul (2006) or Behrman, Kohler, and Watkins (2002), where the
information on networks is limited to the number of contacts of each respondent.
6One strategy that seems not to have been used so far in development economics
is \snowball" sampling (Goodman, 1961) where, starting with a set of initial re-
spondents (seeds), one increases the sample by including those individuals named48
section.
Ultimately, however, we want to probe the validity of one new approach that
we introduce in Section 3.3 and label as random matching: individuals who are
part of a random sample are randomly matched with other individuals from the
same sample and asked about their willingness to establish a link with the random
match, hence both individuals and relationships are randomly sampled. We do
that in two steps. In section 3.4 we discuss whether the elicitation of the will-
ingness to establish a relation allows us to understand the process underlying the
formation of individuals' actual networks. We use data on the social networks of
a random sample of individuals collected in two di®erent ways { through direct
elicitation and through random matching { and show that they yield results that
are statistically indistinguishable. In Section 3.5 we demonstrate the importance
of sampling relationships. Using Monte Carlo simulation, we compare the accu-
racy of the inference with respect to the determinants of network formation when
data on relationships are collected in two di®erent ways: random matching and
the more frequent approach of relying on the set of links from a random sample
of individuals as an accurate image of individuals' networks, which we label as
matches within sample. Our results show that, for di®erent models of network
formation, the random matching approach is, in general, more accurate than using
all matches within sample. Section 4.5 concludes the paper.
by previous respondents. In this case the sampling of relationships and individuals
(after the initial ones) is done simultaneously. Although well-suited for the sam-
pling of \hidden populations", the respondents entering the sample after the seeds
are not randomly selected which complicates inference about the population. See
Heckathorn (2002) for a discussion of the conditions under which this problem can
be solved and Heckathorn and Je®ri (2002) for an application to the analysis of
jazz musician communities.49
3.2 A review of current approaches
The analysis of networks requires data on both individuals and relationships. It
is useful to review how the sampling of both units can and has been done.7 As
with every other survey, individuals are the source of information and the exist-
ing literature employs two strategies to identify them: a census of all individuals
(as in DeWeerdt (2004), Dekker (2004) and, in one village, Goldstein and Udry
(1999)) or, more commonly, a random sample of individuals from the population
of interest. These lead to di®erent network designs, commonly referred as global
versus local network designs, respectively.8 The pros and cons of each strategy
are relatively obvious. Random samples are less expensive but they lead to a loss
of information on the network structure as the information generated is essen-
tially limited to dyads, leaving potentially interesting questions outside the range
of possible analysis.9
Having decided how to sample individuals, the second level of sampling is done
through the construction of a \name generator", a question that is used to elicit
and identify relationships. If \[...] a network is de¯ned by the links as much
as the nodes" (Morris, 2004, p.10), this is a step as important as the selection
of the individual respondents although perhaps less visible: \it happens in the
questionnaire" (Morris, 2004, p.10). Name generators include two parts - the
7Much of the systematization that follows borrows from the clear exposition in
Morris (2004). Several illustrations of the questions that we deal with in this paper
can also be found there, but focusing speci¯cally on the use of social networks to
understand the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS.
8Global and local networks are also known, in the social networks literature, as
sociometric and egocentric networks, respectively.
9This also means that much of the work developed within the ¯eld of social
network analysis, directed to the analysis of complete networks (see Wasserman
and Faust (1994) for an extensive treatment of such methods) cannot be directly
applied to most of the data used by economists.50
relation/behavior and a rule de¯ning how many relations the researcher identi¯es.
As for the relationships among individuals, most of the studies by development
economists look at potential relations, that is, those elicited through questions
of the type \Who could you rely on to ...?" (DeWeerdt, 2004, Fafchamps and
Gubert, 2007, Santos and Barrett, 2007a), while others focused on real relations
through questions such as \From whom did you receive gifts?" (Dekker, 2004,
Krishnan and Sciubba, 2005, Conley and Udry, 2005, Udry and Conley, 2005).
When looking at the motive for establishing the link, most studies focused on
insurance, the exceptions being the analysis of information networks by Conley and
Udry (2005) and Santos and Barrett (2005), and the analysis of the interpersonal
relations through which information, credit, labor and land are transacted in Udry
and Conley (2005), all building on the data collected and described by Goldstein
and Udry (1999). Finally, concerning the \stopping rule", some studies have asked
for all the relationships of the respondents (e.g. DeWeerdt, 2004, Goldstein and
Udry, 1999) while others established a maximum number of links (e.g. Fafchamps
and Gubert, 2007). This methodological diversity, which re°ects both the relative
novelty of the approach and the diversity of substantive questions for which such
data was collected, is summarized in Table 3.1.
Several points arise. The ¯rst, and most obvious, is the extent of missing in-
formation, which is an issue regardless of whether we have a census or a random
sample of individuals. For example, DeWeerdt (2004) reports that his analysis is
limited to approximately two-thirds of the links identi¯ed by his respondents, as
the remaining 1/3 were formed with individuals outside his census unit. Krishnan
and Sciubba (2005, pp. 19-20), whose data on respondents were collected through









































































pendent variable,10 while Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) have much higher values
for the amount of information that is lost: of 939 network members identi¯ed by
206 households, 750 (or 79.9%) are not part of the sample and are disregarded in
their analysis. Other studies, such as Udry and Conley (2005), also mention this
problem, but less directly.11
An evaluation of the importance of these losses is beyond the scope of this paper
as it would require data on complete networks in order to replicate the e®ects of
missing information.12 Nevertheless, one suspects that they are important, not
only due to the extent of missing information but also because there may be non{
random qualitative di®erences between the links that are left out and those that are
identi¯ed. For example, even with complete networks (that is, when all individuals
in a group are being sampled) well still miss the relationships with individuals
outside the census unit. Yet these can be especially valuable if, for example, one
is interested in the performance of informal insurance (as income shocks across
10The authors have data on \more than two-thirds" of the networks under analy-
sis, re°ecting the fact that \in most villages, over 30% of the village forms the sam-
ple and in some cases, about three-quarters of the village was surveyed" (Krishnan
and Sciubba, 2005, p.19).
11In commenting on the graphical representation of the data used in their analy-
sis of the determinants of link formation (Udry and Conley, 2005, Table10.4,
p.257)these authors remark that \There are individuals in each village for each
network who appear isolated in these graphs. That appearance is a misleading
consequence of the strategy of constructing these graphs based on \ego-centric"
data from a random sample of the population. In fact for each of these functional
networks there is virtually no one in any of these villages who has no interactions
with anyone. Virtually everyone in our sample has learning contacts, exchanges
credit and/or gifts, hires labor, and has obtained land from someone. If none of
those other parties happens to be in our sample, the individual appears isolated
in the graphs."(Udry and Conley, 2005, p.250).
12The social network literature dealing with this problem (most recently,
Kossinets (2006)), although not focusing on dyad formation, reports discourag-
ing results regarding the reliability of the estimates of network statistics when
information on nodes or links is missing.53
villages are typically less correlated than within villages, increasing the scope for
mutual insurance) or information °ows (as outside links may provide access to
information that is not easily accessed within the village).
If many relationships are not with individuals who also belong to the sampling
unit, one way to diminish the importance of missing information would be to collect
detailed information on the attributes of the network members for the sampled
individuals. This information could then be used to explain observed patterns of
network formation. While there is evidence that very speci¯c details about links'
activities may not be accurately known,13 there seems to be no a priori reason to
doubt the validity of information on readily observable attributes such as gender,
ethnic a±liation, age (at least within some interval or by comparison with the
respondent), migrant status, etc..
The second point that merits reference is the nature of the link that is sur-
veyed. When limiting the number of relationships elicited from a respondent, as
in Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), one risks eliciting an implicit ranking of the
relationships as these authors recognize.14 The same is true, although perhaps at-
tenuated and less obvious, when one asks for a complete list of relationships. One
can expect that those \closer" to the respondents will have a higher probability of
13For example, Goldstein and Udry (1999, p.20) report that, contrary to what is
assumed in conventional models of social learning (where a group, such as a village,
is assumed to be the network), farmers were not able to provide information about
farm operations for a random sample of farmers in the villages they studied. This is
further reinforced by Hogset and Barrett (2007), where a similar result is obtained
when farmers are asked about details on agricultural practices of farmers that
respondents indicated were in their information network.
14The authors mention that although they ask for a maximum of four relations
per respondent, \In practice, respondents listed on average 4.6 individuals, with
a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 8. This is because in a number of cases
respondents refused to rank individuals they regarded as equivalently close to them.
(Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007, p. 9, footnote 8, emphasis added).54
being remembered and named (Brewer, 2000). In practice, one is leaving out weak
ties, that is, those within the respondent's network who are socially more distant
(Granovetter, 1974).1516
Whether this emphasis on strong ties is a problem probably depends on the
nature of the purpose for which data on networks are being collected (Sobel, 2002,
Chwe, 1999). For some questions (for example, informal insurance), the Folk The-
orem of repeated games would suggest that it is not a problem. In this case, the
network is conceptualized as both a source of transfers and as a disciplining de-
vice that keeps the shadow of defection away; this last function requires proximity
between everyone involved.17 In other contexts (for example, information search),
there seems to be less room for such an assumption as respondents may perceive
those who are \more distant" as valuable sources of new information even if poten-
tially less motivated to provide it (Santos and Barrett, 2005). In any case, and in
general, it seems that relatively little attention has been given to the importance
15In part, this is just a re¯nement of the previous point. Focusing on strong ties
is on way of saying that information on weak ties is missing. See Kohler (1998) for
an analysis of the e®ects of truncating the size of elicited networks on estimates of
network density.
16In the original exposition of the hypothesis of the strength of weak ties, Gra-
novetter (1974, p.1361) writes that \most intuitive notions of the \strength" of
an interpersonal tie should be satis¯ed by the following de¯nition: the strength
of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional
intensity, the intimacy (mutual con¯ding), and the reciprocal services which char-
acterize the tie." In an early review of studies that tried to test this hypothesis,
Granovetter (1982) identi¯es two major ways of operationalizing the concept of
\strength of tie": (i) frequency of contact, used by Granovetter (1974), and (ii)
the assumption that ties with di®erent people (e.g., kin, friends, colleagues and
acquaintances) have di®erent strength. See Marsden and Campbell (1984) for a
discussion.
17But see both Udry (1994), on the role for formal enforcers of such contracts,
and Fafchamps (2002) for a discussion of the possibility of contracts when there is
no evidence \of a single case of an agent being punished by others for dealing with
someone who had previously breached a contract" (pp. 2-3).55
of \weak ties" (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, Ionnanides and Loury, 2004).
The distinction between potential and real links is potentially important.18
Which is more appropriate probably depends on the purpose for which data on
social interactions are being collected. Potential links may matter most when
analyzing forward{looking behavior, as it is the perception that one can rely on a
link, regardless of whether it has been previously used, that likely drives present
decisions. Studying real links would perhaps be preferable when the objective is
to study past behavior, for example to understanding how information networks
have a®ected learning about and dissemination of a new technology.
Clearly, there does not have to be a perfect juxtaposition between the two.
The set of real links will probably be a subset of the potential network as it is
improbable that all potential relations are mobilized in a speci¯c period. For
example, the data collected by Goldstein and Udry (1999) show that, from the set
of individuals who could be contacted when searching for information, only a small
fraction was contacted in the past.
Finally, most analysis to date has implicitly assumed that \everyone knows
everyone else in village settings". As a consequence, the possibility that some
links are not formed because individuals do not know each other has rarely been
raised.19 How to test this assumption is not trivial. One obviously cannot ask a
respondent for a list of individuals that she does not know and to ask for a list of
those she knows seems both infeasible (due to respondent fatigue) and, ultimately,
unconvincing because those not named could have been just momentarily forgotten,
possibly just because of less frequent contact.
18See Harrison and Rutstr} om (2004) for evidence on concerns about hypothetical
bias in nonmarket value elicitation research.
19Santos and Barrett (2005) and Santos and Barrett (2007a) are the exceptions.56
The approach ¯rst used by Goldstein and Udry (1999) - to ask about social
acquaintance between two randomly matched individuals belonging to a sample
allows us to take a ¯rst look at this question.20 Besides showing that not everyone
knows everyone else, their data also show that knowing one's potential partner is a
pre{condition for other interactions, providing support for the idea of embedded-
ness proposed by Granovetter (1985). Purposeful relations are formed from within
a web of social relationships that are not necessarily constructed or maintained
with a speci¯c (instrumental) objective but that allow individuals to evaluate the
costs and bene¯ts of establishing a link with a speci¯c purpose. The sequential
nature of this process has consequences for the econometric model to be estimated
(Maddala, 1983) as the analysis of the determinants of an instrumental network
should be done using the subsample of those who know each other and not the full
sample.21
To summarize, the empirical literature in development economics that has an-
alyzed network formation is small, recent and diverse. The main substantive ques-
tion about it pertains to the reliability of its conclusions when an important part
of the network of interest is missing. In the next section we present an approach,
random matching, that largely obviates this problem.
20Given that, it is not surprising that this approach shares some similarities
with previous suggestions in the social networks literature, notably by Granovetter
(1973). The main di®erence is that in the latter, respondents were presented with
a roster of all individuals in the group (not a random sample) and asked whether
they knew them or not. The results of the application of this approach in a small
group are reported in Erickson, Nosanchuck, and Lee (1981) and Erickson and
Nosanchuck (1983).
21Or, at least, the interpretation of the results should make clear that their
validity also depends on the assumption of generalized inter-knowledge among the
sampled individuals.57
3.3 Random matching
The approach to the sampling of relationships that we validate was ¯rst used by
Goldstein and Udry (1999). We label it random matching. Starting with a random
sample of individuals from a population of interest, one elicits the willingness of
each respondent to enter into some speci¯c relation with a match that is randomly
selected from the same random sample.22 Random matching has three major ad-
vantages relative to alternative methods. First, it naturally ¯ts into the sampling
strategies commonly used to collect micro{level data. Second, by randomly pre-
senting the respondents with di®erent possible matches, one discourages neglect
of \weak links". Finally, we know the characteristics of both the respondent and
her prospective match, hence no information is lost because one of the nodes is
unknown.
That said, it is important to notice the potential limitations and shortcomings
of this approach to the sampling of relationships. In the approaches reviewed in
the previous section, information loss occurs because, when free to choose from the
population, respondents identi¯ed network members who were not in the random
sample. With the random matching approach one relaxes the constraint of looking
at existing links by imposing a new constraint: respondents must think about
forming links with individuals who belong to the random sample. Why can random
matching be trusted or even preferable to the matches within sample approach? It
is easier to start answering this question by considering an example where random
sampling of individuals, that underlies both random matching and matches within
22As we mentioned in the previous section, an important previous step made
possible by this approach is to ¯rst establish whether the respondent is acquainted
with the randomly selected match, allowing for an appreciation of the degree to
which instrumental networks are embedded in a wider web of social connections.58
sample, should not be used.
Consider patronage relations reviewed by Platteau (1995). In ¯gure 3.1 we
represent an extreme setting where only one individual (labeled A) is a suitable
patron for the remaining ones (the clients, labeled by numbers). Clearly if the
sample (represented by full circles) is formed only of clients (here, 1 and 2), who
do not establish (and are unwilling to establish) links between themselves, both
approaches { random matching and matches within sample { would fail in allowing
us to understand the process underlying network formation. In the case of random
matching, because all individuals, unwilling to establish a link with each other,
would (falsely) appear isolated, given that the patron is outside the sample. As for
the direct elicitation of (potential or real) links, the absence of survey information
on the patron would prevent the use of the matches within sample approach, mak-
ing it impossible to understand the decision underlying the formation of this link.
Imagine now that another patron (labeled B) is available, although all clients still
y 1 »»»»»»»»»»»» : y 2 -
i 3 XXXXXXXXXXXX z i A
Figure 3.1: Sampling networks: without a prospective patron in the sample
establish their relationship only with A. The picture would be similar (see ¯gure
3.2) and lets assume that, due to the sampling process, individual B is sampled
but A is not. Direct elicitation of links would leave the researcher exactly in the
same position as before: all individuals would still appear as isolates. Random59
matching, on the other hand, has the potential to reveal something about the link
formation decision, as it is conceivable that clients would be willing to form a link
with B even though, in practice, that link is dominated by that with A.
y 1 »»»»»»»»»»»» : y 2 -
i 3 XXXXXXXXXXXX z i A
y B
Figure 3.2: Sampling networks: with a prospective patron in the sample
Patronage as depicted here is an extreme example of a perhaps more general
case, as suggested by Cox and Fafchamps (2006): individuals have limits to the
number of relations that they can establish and maintain and, as such, social
networks are bounded. It is therefore possible that links that were latent(perhaps
because others were preferable or just because history and inertia led to a particular
network con¯guration) may be \formed" during the questionnaire, allowing for
inference that, in some cases (such as the one depicted in ¯gures 3.1 and 3.1)
would be impossible.
This potential advantage may come at a cost. If the relationships under analy-
sis are the result of a thought experiment during which respondents are (implicitly)
asked to reproduce the reasoning underlying the formation of social links but now
facing a di®erent set of partners it is not inconceivable, given the arti¯ciality of the
experimental setting, that cheap talk (or other noise) might generate connections
that are uninformative about the characteristics of speci¯c networks. It is there-
fore important to probe whether the links elicited following the random matching60
approach accurately re°ect the decision processes underlying actual network for-
mation. We do that in section 3.4.
Our second concern is that random matching involves the analysis of a subset
of the possible relationships between the individuals in the random sample. Is this
better than considering all relationships for which data exist, as in the matching
within sample approach? In section 3.5 we show that for several models of network
formation the answer is clearly \yes".
3.4 Can we trust data on hypothetical networks?
Although data on respondents' willingness to form a link has several advantages
{ it is forward-looking, it can identify feasible and attractive links that have not
yet been activated, etc. { economists and other social scientists have a trained
reticence to use data on hypothetical behaviors. In this section we ask whether we
can trust that the data on hypothetical social network links form the basis for useful
inference on the determinants of network formation. We address this question
empirically, using household survey data collected in 2004 from 120 randomly
selected pastoralist households in four communities of southern Ethiopia that have
been repeatedly interviewed for several years as part of a study that provides rich
background data on the respondents.23
We collected comparable social networks data from these households using
two di®erent approaches. The ¯rst is random matching. In each community we
randomly matched each respondent with ¯ve other respondents that belong to the
random sample from the same site. We then asked whether the respondent knew
23The original data were collected by the Pastoral Risk Management (PARIMA)
project. Barrett et al. (2004) describe the location, survey methods and data.61
the random match and whether the respondent would ask the match for a gift of
one cattle. We subsequently asked our respondents to tell us how many people
they could rely on to ask for cattle as a gift and asked for the names of up to
¯ve of those individuals, starting with the person they would ask ¯rst. These last
two questions reveal the size of the respondents' relevant social network and the
identities of their stronger links once we remove the random matching constraint
that their potential links be with individuals belonging to the random sample.
In one site, we then interviewed as many as possible of the network members
identi¯ed by the sample respondents, thereby providing a characterization of the
respondents' local networks. In this site, one individual was not surveyed during
this round. For three of our initial respondents we couldn't ¯nd any of the in-
dividuals mentioned while seven others were used as starting nodes of a di®erent
questionnaire and not subject to this exercise.
In one site, we then proceed to interview as many as possible of these indi-
viduals, providing a characterization of the respondents' local networks. In this
site, one individual was not surveyed during this round. For three of our initial
respondents we couldn't ¯nd any of the individuals mentioned while seven others
were used as nodes of a di®erent questionnaire and not subject to this exercise.24
The analysis is therefore limited to the networks of 19 respondents, who named
70 people on who they could rely to ask for cattle as a gift. None of them was in
the original sample, hence an analysis of the decision underlying the formation of
these networks based on matches within the sample would be impossible. Of these
24Although we can recover the information on the identity of their network
members and most of them were later found and interviewed, the di®erences in
the survey instrument make these data imperfectly comparable. Thus we choose
not to use them for this exercise.62
70 people, we could trace and interview 46 (approximately two-thirds).25 The di±-
culty we experienced in tracking down the identi¯ed network partners underscores
the di±culties and costs associated with the characterization of local networks. If
random matching generates results that are statistically equivalent to the actual
networks, its simplicity would provide a good argument for its use.
Table 3.2 summarizes the network links established by these two di®erent ap-
proaches for the 19 respondent households for whom we have both types of social
networks data.26 On the surface, the resulting network patterns seem quite di®er-
ent. The random matching approach yields 22.6% of the 93 matches as potential
providers of a cattle transfer, while our characterization of the respondents' local
networks suggests a far lower ¯gure, only 5.7% of the possible matches (where pos-
sible matches are de¯ned as the population of individuals named by at least one
respondent as someone s/he would approach for a cattle transfer). Nonetheless,
it seems hard to extract a conclusion about any behavioral di®erence from these
values, given the di®erences in the ways that these relationship data were collected.
25These data represent the respondents' local networks subject to three caveats.
First, it is clear that we e®ectively inquired about the identity of those who are
socially closest to the respondent. Second, we assume that those individuals not
named by our respondents are not part of their insurance networks. Of course,
this may not be true. Perhaps some of them would be the 6th or the 7th person to
be contacted in case of need but were omitted by our (arbitrary) rule limiting the
insurance network to ¯ve individuals. An obvious consequence of this fact is that
we are most probably underestimating the density of insurance dyads among this
population, although this may not be a serious concern in this case as 10 out of the
19 respondents reported that they could rely on less than 5 individuals. Third, we
cannot control for whether our respondents knew all the people named by other
respondents and we neglect the possibility that insurance networks are embedded
in a wider web of non-instrumental relations of friendship or social acquaintance.
26Some individuals were named by more than one of our respondents. We there-
fore have 50 links elicited among our 19 respondents and the 46 names they gener-
ated. Between these two sets of individuals there are 874 possible links, on which
we only have direct information on 50. As mentioned in the previous footnote, we
must assume that the other 824 links were not formed.63
Table 3.2: Structure of insurance links: two approaches
Link exists? Yes No Total
Random matching27 21 7228 93
Local network 50 82429 874
Total 71 896 967
27 Data for the 19 respondents for who we found




We therefore test econometrically for the equivalence of the networks generated
through random matching and direct elicitation, by estimating the model
Prob (Lij = 1) = ¤(°1Xij) (3.1)
where the link variable (Lij) is a binary variable that equals one if a link between
the respondent (indexed by i) and the match (indexed by j) is formed and is 0
otherwise and Xij is the set of explanatory variables expressed as relative social
distance, as in Santos and Barrett (2005) and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), that
we de¯ne and summarize in Table 3.3. Finally, we assume that the error term, "ij,
follows the logit distribution, where ¤(.) is its cumulative distribution function
and we further assume that
E("ij;"ih) 6= 0 ifj 6= h (3.2)
E("ih;"jh) = 0 if i 6= j (3.3)
Taking advantage of having multiple matches for each respondent, we can then










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































alternative way of modeling the error term is to assume that,
E("ih;"jh) 6= 0 if i 6= j (3.4)
that is, to incorporate the e®ect of matches' unobserved heterogeneity upon the
link formation decision. Both (Udry and Conley, 2005) and Fafchamps and Gubert
(2007) correct the variance matrix for the possible e®ect of matches' unobservables,
using Conley (1999) estimator but do not ¯nd large di®erences due to this correc-
tion.30
We follow a di®erent strategy, using a nonparametric permutation test known as
Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) (Hubert and Schultz, 1976, Krackhardt,
1987, 1988) to obtain correct p-values. The basic intuition behind this procedure
is that the permutation of the data on the dependent variable must maintain its
clustered nature. In practice, this means that the same permutation must be
applied to respondents and matches. We can then estimate the above model when
all correlation between dependent and independent variables is broken through
resampling { that is, when the null hypothesis that all slopes equal zero is known
to be true { and compare our ¯rst estimates with their empirical distribution
obtained through the repetition of this exercise (in our case, 200 times), to generate
a sampling distribution for the parameter estimates. Although we present both
uncorrected and QAP{corrected p-values, we also ¯nd that this added control for
unobserved heterogeneity across individuals yields no substantial di®erence in our
results.
Table 3.4 presents the results of two models. Column (1) reports the parameter
estimates when we consider the data obtained through random matching for the
30Although Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) mention that their Monte Carlo sim-
ulations support the importance given to this issue, as corrected standard errors
can be much larger than uncorrected ones.66
19 respondents for whom we could ¯nd any member of her local network. Column
(2) presents the analogous regression estimates when we analyze the data on local
networks. The qualitative results are quite similar: belonging to the same clan
and being of the same sex have a positive e®ect on the likelihood of a transfer
relationship, although there is considerable di®erence in the precision of these
estimates, likely due in large part to the di®erence in sample size.
To understand if these two approaches produce results that are statistically
similar, such that the random-matching approach can guide our understanding
of how local networks form just as reliably as direct, unconstrained elicitation of
social networks, we pool both sets of observations on links between individuals in
this population and estimate the model
Prob (l
ij = 1) = ¤(°1X
ij;°2(X
ij £ RM)) (3.5)
under the same assumptions as above. The dummy variable RM takes the value 1
if the observation was obtained through random matching and 0 otherwise. A test
of the joint null hypothesis that H0:°2=0 then serves as a test for the statistical
equivalence of the two methods at empirically identifying these insurance networks.
Failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates that both approaches yield similar
information about the structure of social networks.
Table 3.5 presents the regression coe±cient estimates and p{values, as well as
the Wald test of the null hypothesis that °2=0 for the slope terms (i.e., exclud-
ing the intercept, a®ected by the ¯ve name limit we imposed on respondents in
reporting their prospective insurance partners).
The smallest p{value on a single parameter estimate in °2 exceeds 0.2 and the
p{value on the joint null hypothesis is 0.858. Turning to the QAP{corrected p{
































































































Table 3.5: Testing the equivalence between di®erent approaches
Variable Coe±cient p{value QAP
p{value
same clan 1.228 0.000 0.100
same clan £ RM -0.192 0.783 0.410
same sex 0.130 0.714 0.550
same sex £ RM 0.538 0.410 0.320
bigger family 0.010 0.861 0.470
bigger family £ RM -0.091 0.588 0.340
smaller family -0.006 0.905 0.450
smaller family £ RM 0.062 0.605 0.340
more land 0.263 0.352 0.350
more land £ RM -0.104 0.847 0.440
less land -0.002 0.934 0.520
less land £ RM 0.324 0.205 0.050
more cattle -0.055 0.444 0.450
more cattle £ RM -0.142 0.323 0.280
less cattle 0.001 0.785 0.410
less cattle £ RM -0.010 0.516 0.230
more experience 0.004 0.787 0.420
more experience £ RM -0.025 0.434 0.590
less experience -0.004 0.763 0.510
less experience £ RM -0.012 0.669 0.450
constant -3.252 0.000 0.030
constant £ RM 1.607 0.069 0.010
H0:°2=0 (not including constant)
Wald statistic 5.470 0.858
P
j °2(Xij £ RM) j 1.507 0.975
Number observations 967
Number respondents 1969
usual levels of statistical signi¯cance, although in one case (the variable \less land
£ RM") we are clearly at its limit. This does not change our conclusion regarding
the joint null hypothesis, tested through the statistic
X
j °2(Xij £ RM) j (3.6)
that generates a measure of how distant the sum of all slopes is from zero. This test
statistic equals 1.507 (Table 3.5) and has a QAP{corrected p{value of 0.985. We
clearly cannot reject the null hypothesis that random matching provides a method
of identifying the structure of respondents' social networks that is statistically
equivalent to direct elicitation following standard methods. Random matching
does indeed seem to provide useful inference about the structure of local networks.
One way to overcome, at least partially, the fact that we may be looking at
variables that are slightly di®erent is to look at the other piece of information we
have about these networks: the number of links that each respondent thinks can be
mobilized in case of need, this time without any limit imposed by the interviewer.
We have information on this variable for the respondents in the four sites. Does a
model such as the one from equation 3.1 yield predictions of network size that are
accurate enough to give us a good idea of the extent of the respondent's network?
To answer this question we re{estimate the model from equation 3.1 using
the data from the four sites. The estimation results are presented in Table 3.6.31
We then use these results to predict (out of sample) the probability that each
respondent would ask for cattle from any of the 29 potential matches in each
village, hence generating a 30 x 30 matrix of predicted values of probability of a
link.32 Assuming that a link is formed if such probability is above some arbitrary
31Because we only use these results to predict out of sample we skip the presen-
tation and discussion of QAP-corrected p-values.
32By convention, links with oneself do not exist.70
Table 3.6: Asking for gifts
Variable Coe±cient p{value
same clan 1.947 0.000
same sex -0.026 0.810
bigger family 0.015 0.821
smaller family 0.007 0.920
more land -0.054 0.662
less land 0.081 0.505
more cattle -0.002 0.825
less cattle 0.006 0.505
more experience 0.011 0.538
less experience -0.016 0.258
village 1 -0.209 0.747
village 2 -0.436 0.479
village 3 1.343 0.008
constant -2.208 0.000
N 551
threshold (here, 0.5), we can construct a square matrix of links. Finally, summing
across the columns of this matrix we can obtain an estimate of the number of
individuals that each respondent could ask for a transfer.
How does this estimate correlate with the number of people that could be asked
for gifts, as reported by the respondents themselves? Quite highly. The Pearson
correlation coe±cient equals 0.337 (with a p-value of 0.002).33 We interpret this
result as additional supporting evidence that the random matching approach yields
data that accurately re°ect the behavior underlying the formation of these net-
works.
These are not necessarily surprising results. An extensive literature on stated
choice methods suggests that when properly contextualized, elicitation of hypo-
33The coe±cient of rank correlation may even be a better indicator of the ¯t be-
tween the predictions of the model and the elicited values given that the maximum
number of predicted links in each village is constrained to the size of the village
sample and no such constraint was imposed when eliciting the size of the network.
The Spearman ½ is 0.525 and also statistically signi¯cant (p-value=0.000).71
thetical behaviors can provide an accurate view of actual behaviors (Arrow et al.,
1993, Carson and Hanemann, 2005). As a concrete example of this equivalence,
Barr (2003) shows that her experimental results, intended to understand how peo-
ple form insurance networks in villages in Zimbabwe, were mirrored by reality in
that the networks of risk pooling contracts constructed during the experiment and
the networks existing in real life were signi¯cantly correlated.
3.5 Monte Carlo evaluation of di®erent approaches to net-
work sampling
Having shown empirically that randomly matched data on willingness to establish
a link can guide the inference on the determinants of network formation, we now
turn to our second core question: How reliable are inferences about social network
structure based on di®erent approaches to sampling data on individuals and rela-
tionships? We answer this question through the use of Monte Carlo simulation so
that we can know (by construction) the underlying network formation process and
then test which sampling methods generate data that permits accurate inference
of that process.
We start by constructing an arti¯cial village of 200 households that mimics, in
terms of the distribution of the di®erent variables (clan, gender, cattle ownership,
etc.), the data to be used in section 3.4 (and described in Table 3.3, column
1). We then consider three models of link formation. In the ¯rst, which we call
Random Links, these variables play no role in explaining the relationships between
individuals, which originate purely through a random process. Although we do
not believe this re°ects actual behavior underlying the formation of instrumental72
networks, it provides a useful benchmark with which to compare the performance
of the di®erent sampling strategies, as it helps us establishing whether particular
sampling designs might be predisposed to suggest structure where none really
exists.
In the second model of link formation, which we call Structured Links, the
propensity to form a link is a linear function of the variables included in the
characterization of the village, similar to the one that we estimated for the set
of all respondents in the previous section (presented in Table 3.6). When this
propensity is above a certain threshold (here, 0) a link is formed. Our third and
¯nal model is a minor variation on the Structured Links model, in which we limit
the number of links an individual may form. We call this process Limited Links.
Again, a threshold in the propensity to form a link has to be crossed for a link to
be formed (the threshold remains 0) but an individual cannot form more than a
limited number of links. For those who would surpass the limit, links are randomly
deleted down to the imposed (and common, within the village) limit. We obviate
this admittedly mechanical way of capping the number of links in a network by
considering the e®ect of di®erent limits (10, 20 and 30 links).
After specifying the structural process of social link generation, we then esti-
mate, in the population, the same logit model from equation 3.1 (repeated here
for convenience),
Prob(Lij = 1) = ¤(°1Xij)
where the variables have the same meaning as above: Lij is a binary variable that
is equal to one if a link between i and j is formed, Xij is the set of explanatory
variables expressed as relative social distance and ¤(.)is the logit cumulative dis-
tribution function. In table 3.7 we present the population estimates of this model,73
the \true" relation between the links and the explanatory variables for each of the
three network formation models under consideration.
Table 3.7: Logit estimates of the link formation decision
Random Structured Limited Links
Links Links 10 20 30
Same clan 0.0338 2.2467 0.3478 0.4939 0.6817
Same sex 0.0182 0.4027 0.0074 0.4230 0.6005
More experience -0.0006 0.5565 -0.1211 -0.0271 0.0581
Less experience 0.0003 -0.5605 -0.1528 -0.2428 -0.1174
More land 0.0582 1.4182 1.3666 -0.4339 -1.2254
Less land 0.0136 -1.2401 -1.3031 0.4746 0.0010
More cattle -0.0002 -0.6689 -0.0485 -0.0401 -0.0422
Less cattle 0.0000 -0.0847 -0.0065 -0.0235 -0.0263
Bigger household -0.0110 -1.7549 -0.0089 0.1164 0.0586
Smaller household -0.0065 0.3423 0.3200 0.3446 0.0593
Constant 0.3256 4.5544 -2.0324 -1.8256 -1.8109
In the remainder of this section we analyze how well one can recover the un-
derlying structure of network formation through the use of two di®erent sampling
strategies. The ¯rst randomly samples individuals and then considers all the links
among these individuals, the commonplace matches within sample approach. The
second is the random matching approach, which, as explained above, randomly
samples relations among randomly sampled individuals. While the ¯rst approach
is perhaps easy to understand (we sample individuals and consider all the links
between them), the second involves a second level of random sampling, as we just
consider some of the possible links formed by the randomly selected individuals.
Given that we're interested in understanding which approach gives us a more
accurate representation of the link formation process in the population (known by




where °population represents the parameter vector for each underlying model of net-
work formation and is given in Table 3.7. For each sampling method { matches
within sample and random matching, the latter with 5, 10 or 15 random matches
{ and for each of four di®erent sampling ratios (0.33, 0.50, 0.66 and 0.90) we gen-
erate 100 samples and estimate the logit equation 3.1 each time. Table 3.8 reports
the frequency with which we fail to reject null hypothesis (equation 3.7), i.e., the
frequency with which the resulting sample generates inferences consistent with the
true underlying data generating procedure.34 The Stata code used to generate the
village characteristics, the links between individuals, the sampling procedures and
how we evaluate their consequences is presented in the Appendix.
This Monte Carlo analysis yields four main results. First, inference based on
matches within sample, the most commonly used approach for analyzing local
networks, seems valid only when links are formed randomly, an unlikely and unin-
teresting case, as it would signal that no intentional behavior is present. For other
models of network formation, matches within sample seem to perform well only
when the sampling ratio is quite high. Under the \structured links" and di®erent
\limited links" models, the matches within sample approach is virtually incapable
of revealing the structure of link formation for sampling ratios as high as 2/3.
This calls into question the reliability of inference about social network formation
patterns based on data collected using the matches within sample method.
Second, as a rule, the random matching approach beats the matches within
34Percentage of failure to reject H0 : °sample = °population, based on 100 repli-
cates.\Limited links (10)" refers to the link formation process where we imposed
that no individual established more than 10 links; \Limited links (20)" and \Lim-
ited links (30)" have similar interpretations.\Random matching: 5 relations" refers
to presenting each respondent with 5 randomly sampled from matches within the
sample; \Random matching: 10 relations" and \Random matching: 15 relations"
have similar interpretations.75
Table 3.8: Monte Carlo evaluation of two sampling approaches:Matches
within sample vs. Random matching
Sampling ratio (individuals) 33 50 66 90
Random Links
Matches within sample 92 99 100 100
Random matching: 5 relations 96 96 96 94
Random matching: 10 relations 98 94 95 99
Random matching: 15 relations 96 100 95 95
Structured Links
Matches within sample 0 0 0 92
Random matching: 5 relations 25 29 63 69
Random matching: 10 relations 11 26 47 73
Random matching: 15 relations 1 15 48 78
Limited Links (10)
Matches within sample 4 2 4 60
Random matching: 5 relations 73 83 91 93
Random matching: 10 relations 68 70 86 93
Random matching: 15 relations 58 57 82 92
Limited Links (20)
Matches within sample 2 1 4 44
Random matching: 5 relations 74 79 91 95
Random matching: 10 relations 52 70 79 96
Random matching: 15 relations 38 58 74 97
Limited Links (30)
Matches within sample 0 1 3 30
Random matching: 5 relations 74 84 92 94
Random matching: 10 relations 51 68 77 91
Random matching: 15 relations 38 57 66 9376
sample approach. Especially in the \limited links" models, the performance of
the random matching model is far better than that of the matches within sample
approach, albeit still imperfect. Indeed, this is not to say that random matching is
adequate under all circumstances. In particular, if social links are formed according
to what we termed \structured links", i.e., without limits to the size of networks,
then this approach can still perform quite poorly, even if it remains clearly superior
to the \matches within sample" approach under standard sampling ratios (i.e.,
below 90%).
Third, our capacity to accurately describe the link formation decision decreases
as we increase the number of relations sampled, emphasizing the importance of
sampling relations after sampling individuals, re°ecting the double nature of social
networks. Given that in the limit, when each respondent in a sample is presented
with all possible matches, the two procedures are identical this is a plain conse-
quence of the already discussed superiority of the random matching approach when
compared to the matches within sample. This is especially evident in the more
interesting models, when links are not randomly formed, and for sampling ratios
below 90%.
Finally, we notice that the results regarding the adequacy of the random match-
ing approach under the Limited Links model does not change much with the max-
imum number of links allowed (and, consequently, with the density of links in the
population). Random matching appears slightly more accurate the lower the limit
on the number of links formed in the population. But what really seems to matter
most is the existence of such a limit.77
3.6 Conclusions
This paper makes a methodological contribution to the growing literature that
aims at understanding how social networks are formed, typically as a ¯rst step
toward analysis of social networks' role in explaining individual behavior and out-
comes. We validate a new approach to the collection of data on network structure
{ which we label \random matching" { where individuals from a random sample
are allowed to form links with randomly matched individuals from the same sam-
ple. The central advantages of this approach are two: the ease with which it can
be integrated into the surveys that economists commonly conduct and use and the
fact that both respondent and match are part of the sample.
We compare the determinants of individuals' decision to link or not to link
with a random match with the determinants of directly elicited local networks and
conclude that these two data collection processes generate statistically identical
results with respect to the correlates of social network structure. Furthermore, the
size of the predicted network generated by the random matching data is highly
correlated with the size of the local network directly elicited from survey respon-
dents. Finally, we demonstrate, via Monte Carlo methods, the superiority of this
random matching approach relative to the more conventional method of using all
the links between individuals in a random sample.
The way in which we established the relation between the elicited size of the
respondent's network and its predicted size at the end of section 3.4 also suggests
how we believe researchers might usefully employ the random matching approach
to sampling social networks. In addition to providing a statistically valid means
of eliciting data for analysis of social network structure, which may be interesting
in its own right, one can also use the resulting parameter estimates to predict78
respondents' networks and subsequently perform analyzes based on those predicted
networks. This is similar, in spirit, to the analysis by Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998),
who estimate a latent variable model to infer the unobserved reference groups of
respondents, after which the means of behaviors within such groups (in their case,
hours of work and labor force participation rate) are used as explanatory variables
for individual decisions (in their case, the labor market behaviors of Dutch women).
In doing this, one must recognize, however, that we start from simple local rules
and aim at the complete structure. Although some evidence exists on the utility
of such approach for some questions,35 more work is probably needed before the
validity of these generated variables is reasonably established.
This paper by no means resolves questions of how to identify the structure
of social networks of all sorts and under all conditions. Our results re°ect only
data from insurance networks in just one location, and it is also obvious that the
utility of asking questions about potential links is limited in some cases.36 But,
if the validity of the random matching approach to collecting data on social net-
works is con¯rmed in other settings, it could help establish a statistically valid and
cost-e®ective method for generating data for social networks analysis to respond
to burgeoning questions about the role and importance of social connectivity in
processes of economic development, free of some of the key inferential problems
that presently plague this literature.
35See the discussion in Morris (2003) and an application to the epidemiology of
HIV in Kretzschmar and Morris (1997)
36It is hard to imagine, for example, how and why one would ask a respondent
about his/her willingness to form a sexual network, even if cultural norms made
such questions permissible.Yet understanding such networks is essential to study
the epidemiology of sexually transmitted diseases.Chapter 4
Persistent poverty and informal credit
4.1 Introduction
Risk is a central feature of life in rural areas of developing countries and therefore
has appropriately attracted much attention in the economics literature. The focus
of much of this literature has been on how households smooth consumption in the
face of idiosyncratic variations in income, either by analyzing how speci¯c actions
{ most commonly, credit, insurance or savings { contribute to that objective,1 or
by asking how well the complete set of available instruments performs in stabilizing
consumption.2 The consumption smoothing literature uniformly starts, however,
from a key assumption that shocks have only transitory consequences, in other
words that the income generation process is stationary. Coate and Ravallion (1993,
p.4), for example, justify their focus on symmetric insurance arrangements with
the assumption that \either player could end up `rich' or `poor' in any period"
with equal probability. However, the assumption that income generation processes
are stationary and thus that all poverty is transitory does not easily square with
the empirical evidence, which suggests that a substantial share of poverty in many
low{income countries is persistent (Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000, Barrett, Carter,
and Little, 2006) and that rates of intergenerational earnings transmission are high
even in high income countries (Solon, 2002).
As is widely recognized, uninsured risk and persistent poverty may be linked,
1See Alderman and Paxson (1994), Besley (1995) or Lim and Townsend (1998)
for useful reviews.
2Deaton (1992) and Townsend (1994) are key contributions in a large literature
that tests for the presence of full insurance or risk pooling in developing countries.
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either because poorer individuals choose safer investment portfolios that prove,
on average, less pro¯table (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993, Morduch, 1995,
Dercon, 1996, Bardhan, Bowles, and Gintis, 2000), or because negative shocks have
a disproportionately detrimental impact on poor people's investments, perhaps
especially with respect to the formation of human capital (Jacoby and Skou¯as,
1997, Dasgupta, 1997, Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey, 2006, Carter et al., 2007).
Whether due to the former, ex ante e®ects or the latter, ex post ones, risk and
shocks may have long-lasting e®ects on welfare status. But while the link from risk
to persistent poverty has been probed extensively, the link from persistent poverty
back to risk management options remains underdeveloped. This paper aims to
contribute to ¯lling that void.
Theoretical models in which poverty is a stable dynamic equilibrium suggest
two key conditions under which short-term shocks can have longer-term conse-
quences. First, a non{convexity in some technology generates a critical threshold,
an unstable dynamic equilibrium at which wealth dynamics bifurcate. This causes
the mapping from current to future wealth to exhibit multiple stable dynamic equi-
libria. When at least one of them associated with consumption below the poverty
line, a (stochastic) poverty trap emerges. Second, some sort of market imperfec-
tion, on average, prevents those initially below the unstable dynamic equilibrium
from moving themselves above the threshold so as to jump onto a path that con-
verges on a higher welfare level. In such a world, even a transitory shock associated
with a stationary stochastic process can have permanent e®ects. This has been
well-recognized in the literature (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005, Carter and Bar-
rett, 2006). What has not yet been recognized is that the ¯rst condition above
{ the existence of an unstable dynamic equilibrium wealth level { might induce81
the market imperfection that is the second condition for risk to cause persistent
poverty. Multiple equilibria might lead to credit (and insurance) rationing that ex-
cludes the poorest, those who most need ¯nancial instruments to manage risk. In
this paper we empirically explore this possibility that nonconvex wealth dynamics
might induce exclusion of the very poor from informal credit markets that might
facilitate their escape from poverty.
The extensive literature on equilibrium credit rationing focuses largely on ad-
verse selection and moral hazard may cause the poor to be disproportionately
rationed out of credit markets.3 Poverty matters because it leads to \desperation"
(Banerjee, 2000): the poor are not creditworthy because, having too little to loose,
it may be prohibitively costly for a lender to punish them in case of default (see
also Banerjee and Newman (1993)). This paper suggests an additional plausible
explanation. If the lender has an interest in the results of the project because in-
formal loans bundle an insurance or equity element with the loan { as Udry (1994)
¯nds in studying northern Nigeria { then the presence of non{convexities may turn
the unstable dynamic equilibrium (or its neighborhood) into a focal point for loans,
since this is the point at which the expected gains to the borrower are greatest.
In this context, those who are not too poor (the \middle class") become preferred
borrowers, while both poorer individuals and the very rich are excluded from such
credit arrangements. Observing such behavior in informal credit arrangements
would reinforce a key long-recognized policy implication of non{convexities: small
transfers can have large, long-term welfare impacts if they lift an ex ante poor re-
cipient onto a path of sustained accumulation towards a higher level equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
3See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) or Carter (1988) for early contributions to this
literature and Banerjee (2001) for an excellent recent synthesis.82
setting we study and the data we use, collected from Boran pastoralists in southern
Ethiopia, drawing partially on previous work (Lybbert et al., 2004, Santos and
Barrett, 2006) that has documented nonlinear wealth dynamics and the presence of
an unstable dynamic wealth equilibrium in this system and explained the apparent
sources of this structure. In this paper, we take the existence of such phenomena
as given in order that we can focus on the implications of prospective multiple
equilibria on informal lending relationships. In section 4.3 we study how informal
credit networks form among Boran pastoralists. We ¯nd that the decision to extend
credit (in kind) to an individual is better explained by the expected gains due to
the transfer than by the recipient's expected capacity to repay the loan. This
result is robust to a series of additional controls for individual ability, correlation
in asset returns between borrower and lender, and the ex ante network of the
lender. These ¯ndings imply a \middle class" bias in informal lending of the sort
we study, in which the poorest members are rationed out of informal credit markets
in equilibrium due to the existence of an unstable dynamic wealth equilibrium.
In section 4.4 we then study patterns of social acquaintance (hereafter, social
networks) and ¯nd that wealth plays a role in explaining who is known within a
community. Being destitute (i.e., having no wealth in cattle) has a strong, negative
impact on the probability of being known within the community. And since credit
networks are nested within social networks, social invisibility further reinforces the
exclusionary process associated with credit rationing. Finally, section 4.5 discusses
the policy implications of our ¯ndings.83
4.2 Nonlinear wealth dynamics: evidence from southern
Ethiopia
Lybbert et al. (2004) analyze wealth dynamics among Boran pastoralists, a poor
population in southern Ethiopia. Using herd history data for 55 households over
a 17 year period, they show that herd dynamics follow a S-shaped curve with two
stable equilibria (at approximately 1 and 35{40 cattle), separated by an unstable
threshold (at 12{16 cattle), consistent with stylized poverty traps models. Drawing
on prior ethnographic research and extensive direct ¯eld observation, the authors
suggest that this threshold results from a minimum critical herd size necessary
to undertake migratory herding to deal with spatiotemporal variability in forage
and water availability. Those with smaller herds are forced to stay near their base
camps, where pasture conditions soon get degraded, leading to a collapse of herd
size towards the low-level stable equilibrium, while those with bigger herds can
migrate in search of adequate water and pasture, enabling them to sustain far
larger herds.4
These authors present two other ¯ndings that help motivate the present paper.
First, they show that asset risk is predominantly idiosyncratic. This creates con-
ditions conducive to the implementation of welfare-improving insurance or lending
contracts among pastoralist households. Nevertheless and second, inter-household
gifts and loans of cattle are conspicuously limited.5 The purpose of this paper is
4During migration only part of the household moves, mainly young men, who
are physically strong enough to undertake arduous, long treks to move herds be-
tween distant water points and to protect them against (human and animal) preda-
tors. Hence the need for a su±ciently large herd that can be split and still feed
both the migrant herders and the remaining (largely child, aged, in¯rm and female)
members of the household who are left at the base camp.
5Several recent studies from semi-arid African systems con¯rm the relatively
small importance of gifts and loans, both of income (Lentz and Barrett, 2004) and84
to understand whether such paucity of prospectively welfare-improving informal
¯nancial transactions might be a direct consequence of the apparent poverty trap
faced by these pastoralists.
In order to answer that question, in 2004 we collected new data on expected
wealth dynamics and on bilateral credit relations within the same communities
(but not the same individual respondents) studied by Lybbert et al. (2004). This
e®ort took place within a larger research project that has repeatedly surveyed
these same households since 2000, generating a data set that includes rich detail
on household composition, migration histories and herd changes, among other
relevant characteristics.6 The data on expected wealth dynamics are discussed
and analyzed in detail in Santos and Barrett (2006). Here we only brie°y present
key elements of that discussion that are necessary to understand our two key
explanatory variables: borrowers' expected gains from a loan and their expected
future wealth.
We ¯rst asked each respondent about his/her expectation regarding weather
conditions for the coming year. We then assigned each respondent four initial
(hypothetical) herd sizes, randomly selected from the interval 1{60 animals, and
then elicited their subjective herd size distribution one year ahead, given the state
of nature just elicited and the seed herd size. These data equipped us to model
the relation between initial and expected future wealth - herds are the lone non-
human form of wealth in the study area - for each of the four states of nature
considered (drought, bad year, good year, very good year). Combined with me-
teorological information on rainfall histories, these estimates were enabled us to
assets (McPeak, 2004, Kazianga and Udry, 2006, McPeak, 2006)
6The data were collected by the Pastoral Risk Management (PARIMA) project
of the USAID Global Livestock Collaborative Research Support Program. Barrett
et al. (2004) describe the location, survey methods and available information.85
simulate the empirical distribution of herd size several periods (up to ten years)
ahead. Motivated by the large dispersion of expected herd size under conditions
of bad rainfall, we then investigated how latent ability to deal with shocks a®ected
wealth dynamics.7 Using the estimated herding ability for each respondent, we
classi¯ed respondents into two categories: low ability (those in the 4th quartile)
and a residual higher ability category. We then redid the herd growth simulations
described above to establish the relation between expected wealth and initial herd
size for each state of nature and each ability category. The results, presented in ¯g-
ure 4.1, suggest a complex growth mechanism that combines both club convergence
(de¯ned by herders' ability) and, for the higher{ability club, multiple equilibria.
Our data on the willingness to extend credit to an individual follows an ap-
proach introduced by Goldstein and Udry (1999). We randomly matched each
respondent with other respondents from the sample and asked two types of ques-
tions. The ¯rst about (real) social networks, through the question \Do you know
(the match)?". The other on the possibility of transferring cattle as a loan if
the match asked for it.8 The latter question provides information on potential
credit networks and is the subject of study in the next section. Our approach to
data collection o®ers one major advantage relative to previous studies of informal
transfers. Because we know the characteristics of both lender and borrower, we
7More precisely, we used the 2000-3 panel data to estimate a herd growth func-
tion frontier using a composed error term that includes a symmetric random com-
ponent re°ecting standard sampling and measurement error and a one-sided term
re°ecting herder-speci¯c, time-invariant ine±ciency, which we assumed follows a
truncated normal distribution. The results are available upon request and are
discussed at length in Santos and Barrett (2006).
8We asked also about the possibility of transferring cattle as gifts but the pat-
tern of answers is virtually identical and loans and gifts seem empirically indistin-
guishable. Out of 561 matches, in only 13 (2.3%) does the decision di®er between
loans and gifts. We therefore concentrate on transfers deemed \loans" in what
follows.86
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Figure 4.1: Heterogeneous wealth dynamics
can avoid concerns of biased estimates due to lack of knowledge about one end of
this relation (Rosenzweig, 1988, Cox and Rank, 1992).
However, there are two prospective problems with this approach. First, by
studying links between individuals rather than the transfers themselves, one risks
errors due to excessive discretization. This does not seem to be a problem in our
data because informal asset transfers among Boran pastoralists are quite small. In
our sample, over the period 2000{03, there were 15 such transfers, out of which 12
(i.e., 80%) were of 1 or 2 cattle. 9 For that reason, and with only a slight abuse of
language, we use the terms \credit network formation" and \loans" interchangeably
in what follows.
9A separate survey of cattle transfers motivated by shocks, conducted in 2004,
in the same geographical area but with di®erent respondents, suggests even greater
dominance of small transfers: out of 112 transfers, 102 (or 91%) were of 1 animal,
8 (or 7%) were of 2 cattle and the remaining less than 2% were more than 2 cattle.87
Second, one might reasonably wonder how well potential credit networks elicited
in this manner re°ect the decision process underlying the formation of real credit
networks. In a separate paper Santos and Barrett (2007b) we show that the in-
ferred determinants of insurance networks derived from the approach used in this
paper closely match those obtained from analysis of real insurance relations among
the same population. The appeal of using randomly matched respondents thus
seems to outweigh the prospective pitfalls of using discrete data on hypothetical
transfers.10
4.3 Nonlinear wealth dynamics and credit networks
The basic pattern of answers to the credit link questions is described in Table 4.1.
Three key facts emerge clearly. First, not everyone knows everyone else, even in
this rural, ethnically homogeneous setting in which households pursue the same
livelihood and there is very little in{ or out{migration. Although most people
know the random match presented to them, almost 14% of the matches were
unknown by the respondent. Second, social acquaintance is, for our respondents,
clearly a necessary condition for willingness to make a loan: in only 2/69 cases did
a respondent indicate that they would be willing to lend livestock to someone they
did not know. The sequential structure of these answers carries consequences for
our econometric strategy { in particular, it leads us to estimate the determinants
of insurance networks only on the subsample of those who know their matches
(Amemyia, 1975, Maddala, 1983) { and raises the additional question of identifying
10The bene¯ts of using experimental data in the study of social capital (a concept
closely related to that of social networks) is emphasized by Durlauf and Fafchamps
(2005). Barr (2003) also concludes that experimental evidence is mirrored by
reality.88
Table 4.1: Knowing and lending: a sequential process
Lend Yes No Total
Know
No 67 2 69
Yes 367 144 511
Total 434 146 580
the correlates of exclusion from social networks, one that we explore in section 4.4.
Finally, knowing people is by no means a su±cient condition for pastoralists to
be willing to transfer animals to a match. In just under one quarter of the cases
where the respondent knew the match was he or she willing to lend an animal to
the match. The acquaintance between lender and borrower seems therefore to be
necessary but insu±cient for obtaining credit.
4.3.1 Understanding exclusion from credit contracts
The intuition behind the analysis of these responses is that respondents evaluate
the expected bene¯ts and costs of each potential link/loan, answering "yes" if their
evaluation of the bene¯ts exceeds the costs. Two motives may enter this calculus:
the possibility that the borrower may not repay the loan and the value of the
compensation for parting with an animal.
The ¯rst motive is the one usually emphasized in the literature that explores
the relation between wealth and exclusion from contracts (see Banerjee (2001) for
a review), usually concluding for a monotonically positive relation between bor-
rower's wealth and its creditworthiness. If informal credit were strictly a textbook
debt instrument, this might be the end of the story.89
In our setting, however, as in many developing country settings, loans often
come bundled with quasi{insurance (Udry, 1994) or an element of equity invest-
ment. Among the Boran, as we show below, lending is overwhelmingly in response
to shocks, thus it functions much like insurance. Furthermore, informal lending
traditions in this culture hold that the loan of a cow (even money to be used to buy
animals, which is becoming less rare) entitles the lender not only to the original
animal (the conventional loan component) but also to its male o®spring, with fe-
male calves kept by the borrower. This introduces a second channel through which
a borrower's wealth may matter: the borrower's expected herd growth drives the
expected returns to the lender.
Clearly, these motives are non{exclusive and we can think that they jointly
lead Boran pastoralists (indexed by i) to make lending decisions as if maximizing
the net expected returns (ER) on a loan of one cattle to another herder (indexed
by j):
ERij = ¾EGj £ r(EWj) ¡ 1 (4.1)
Here, EGj stands for j's Expected Gains from a loan, ¾ stands for the lenders' share
in the gains from the loan, which is set by social convention (the male o®spring
hence, on average, half the gains), and r(EW) is the repayment function, which
we assume, following the extant literature, to be a monotonically strictly positive
function of borrower's Expected Wealth (EW), both evaluated at some relevant
horizon T. Let
EW ´ E0 f
T X
t=0
F(Wjt + lij) £ µjtj Á(µ);W0;®jg (4.2)
where F(²) is a growth function, Wjt is borrower's wealth at time t, lij is the binary
decision re°ecting the lender's decision regarding the loan, Á(µ) is the distribution90
function of the production shocks, µ, and ®j de¯nes borrower's ability. Before we
discuss the characteristics of the growth function, we de¯ne Expected Gains as
EG ´ (EWjlij = 1) ¡ (EWjlij = 0) (4.3)
Clearly, both EG and EW are a function of the same variables, namely borrower's
ability and initial wealth, raising important empirical questions regarding the iden-
ti¯cation of the importance of each motive.
The growth function, F(²), in its most general form incorporates two possibili-
ties, identi¯ed in earlier work in this environment (Santos and Barrett, 2006) and
represented in ¯gure 4.1. First, household characteristics (e.g., intrinsic ability,
®j) may sort cross{sectional units into distinct cohorts or clubs, c. Second, within
each club, agents might face nonlinear dynamics { in particular, the possibility of
a critical threshold value, °c, at which the welfare dynamics bifurcate, with one
path, subscripted l , leading to a low-level equilibrium and another, subscripted
h, leading to a high-level equilibrium. These possibilities imply that for each in-









l(Wjt + lij) if j 2 c, Wjt · °c
Fc
h(Wjt + lij) if j 2 c, Wjt > °c
(4.4)
The empirical relevance of the di®erent variables has important implications
11Borrowing the terms from the growth literature, this speci¯cation can be sim-
pli¯ed into a club convergence approach (as in Quah (1997)) if there are no asset
thresholds at which asset dynamics bifurcate (that is, °c=0, 8 c), or into a thresh-
old model (as in Azariadis and Drazen (1990)) if there is only one club (that is,
C=1). In the more standard case, one would assume that F(²) is concave, and
that there are no convergence clubs or thresholds. Several approaches have been
recently suggested to identify convergence clubs (for example, Canova (2004)) and
thresholds (for example, Hansen (2000)) but not, to our knowledge, both. In
the empirical section we'll build on previous work (?Santos and Barrett, 2006) to
identify both convergence clubs and accumulation thresholds.91
for our understanding of informal bilateral credit relations and for related policy
interventions. If only matches' expected wealth drives credit access, it would signal
that, although persistent poverty plays a role, the wealth threshold per se does is
not important. In this case, we would expect the wealthiest herders to be the
primary bene¯ciaries of these loans.
Given the small size of these loans, expected growth, even after the loan, is
low or even negative for those in the vicinity of the stable equilibria (that is, the
wealthiest or the poorest members of the community). On the other hand, and
in expectation, they enable those below and \su±ciently close" to the unstable
equilibrium to recover onto a growth path leading to a higher level equilibrium.12
If expected gains guide the allocation of transfers, it might then induce a bias that
favors herders of intermediate wealth. Such a pattern, if it exists, would suggest
that the e®ects of informal lending (or equivalent insurance arrangements) in the
presence of nonconvexities might be best understood as a mechanism to prevent
participants from falling into persistent poverty.
Although in the empirical part of this paper we'll mainly focus on the analysis of
12Given the standard transfer of one animal from one household to another, in-
dividual transfers can clearly serve this safety net purpose only for those herders
quite close the unstable equilibrium. One needs to recognize, however, that this
limitation is purely an artifact of the two person, dyadic model we employ. Anecdo-
tal evidence from a survey of life histories collected during ¯eldwork suggests that
coordinated transfers are commonly sought and obtained, raising the potential for
transfers to perform such a role over a wider herd size range although, unfortu-
nately, not so wide as to catch the very poor or the destitute: the maximum size of
a transfer such as this was 5 cattle. This is further corroborated by anthropological
work among the Boran (Dahl, 1979, Bassi, 1990) on the functioning of busa gonofa,
an institution through which such coordination is achieved. Similar institutions
have been analyzed among other east African pastoralist societies (for example,
Potkanski (1999)). Coordination of transfers raises a separate set of questions {
e.g., how are the obvious free rider problems resolved? { that cannot be pursued
here.92
these two considerations { expected wealth with its standard e®ect on likelihood of
repayment and expected gains { several other explanations of rationing of credit or
insurance contracts merit attention. The closest study, empirically, to our analysis
is McPeak (2006). The author explores di®erent motives for livestock transfers
in an environment quite similar to ours (the rangelands of Northern Kenya) and
¯nds that transfers are targeted to wealthier pastoralists, which he interprets as
re°ecting di®erential capacity to reciprocate the original transfer, essentially our
r(EW) function. More surprisingly, he ¯nds support for an interpretation of asset
transfers as a form of precautionary savings (his term) as transfers do not seem
to be triggered by recent wealth shocks. We di®er from this study in that we
analyze the formation of credit networks through which such transfers occur and
can condition our analysis on expected gains thanks to our analysis of the wealth
dynamics. Omission of this term from McPeak (2006) could explain the di®erence
in our results.
Ho® (1997) analyzes the relation between insurance arrangements, the erosion
of investment incentives and the persistence of poverty, and predicts matches along
wealth levels. Individuals with high enough expected wealth may not invest in
insurance relations because the expected bene¯ts may not compensate for expected
net contributions to the insurance pool. This result implicitly depends on the lack
of convergence in incomes between agents (i.e., some have higher expected income
than others) and relies heavily on the impossibility of separating insurance from
redistribution due to egalitarian sharing rules, an environment quite di®erent from
the one that we study. In the empirical section we test Ho®'s model as well, since
we use data from both sides of the credit contract and control for the lender's
wealth.93
Given that informal transfers can insure only against idiosyncratic shocks, as-
set covariance between potential insurance partners should matter to contracting
choices, as the literature on peer selection in micro-credit arrangements suggests
(Ghatak, 1999, Sadoulet and Carpenter, 1999). Agents might therefore rationally
opt out of insurance contracts with those whose wealth covaries strongly with their
own wealth. We'll address this possibility below as well, as an additional check on
our results.
Finally, Murgai et al. (2002) suggest that the costs of establishing insurance
links may limit the domain of equilibrium contracting. Genicot and Ray (2003)
likewise suggest that insurance groups may be bounded because risk-sharing arrange-
ments need to be robust to deviations by sub{groups. Although these authors do
not explicitly model wealth as a source of friction that might prevent insurance
links from forming, they o®er complementary explanations for the behavior that
we observe. In our empirical work, we therefore control also for covariates that may
re°ect di®erences in the degree of enforcement of such contracts or of monitoring
of other agent's activity and, less perfectly, for the degree of alternative insurance
ex ante of the link formation decision.13
13Unlike Genicot and Ray (2003), we address network formation rather than
group formation. Groups di®er from networks because the latter lack common
boundaries. If A establishes a link with B, the fact that B already has a link with
C does not mean that A will also have a (direct) link with C. Hence considerations
about sub-group deviations may be less of a concern here than in more formalized
institutions such as, for example, the funeral insurance groups studied by Bold
(2005).94
4.3.2 Econometric model
We study respondents' decision (to lend or not) using a model that nests the
di®erent explanations/motives for asset transfers under the reduced form
Prob(lij = 1) = ¤(EGj;EWj;Lj;®j;Wi;Xij) (4.5)
where lij =1 denotes that a credit link is formed between i (the respondent) and j
(the match), EGj is the match's expected gains from the loan of 1 animal, EWj
is the match's expected wealth after the same transfer, Lj indicates whether the
match lost cattle in the recent past (in practice, the period 2000/03 for which we
have data), ®j is a classi¯cation of the respondent as being of low or higher ability,
Wi is the respondent's wealth and the Xij vector captures a range of covariates
describing the distance, in both the physical and socio-economic space, between i
and j. Finally, ¤ is the logit cumulative distribution function and we assume that
relations are nested within respondents:
E("ij;"ih) 6= 0 if j 6= h (4.6)
E("ih;"jh) = 0 if i 6= j (4.7)
where "ij is the error term of the regression. Taking advantage of having multiple
matches for each respondent, we can then estimate equation 4.5 using a random
e®ects speci¯cation of the logit model. Three issues need to be addressed before we
present our estimates: (1) the way we construct our two central variables, expected
gains from a loan and expected wealth, and how is identi¯cation obtained, (2) the
way we express the distance between respondent and match (the vector Xij), which
di®ers from the formalization of social distance presented in Akerlof (1997) and
used in much of the empirical work, and (3) how to address the inferential problems95
that may arise if, contrary to our assumptions regarding the error term, unobserved
heterogeneity across individuals is important for the network formation decision.
Both the expected gains and expected wealth variables were created following
the simulation procedure brie°y described above and in detail in Santos and Barrett
(2006). We de¯ne borrower's \expected wealth" as the probability that future herd
size ten years hence, post transfer of one animal, will be larger than a speci¯ed
value { 30 cattle { given actual (2003) herd size. 14 We de¯ne \expected gains" of
a loan as the di®erence in expected herd size, 10 years ahead, due to the transfer of
1 cattle given actual herd size. Both variables are graphically represented in Figure
4.2, with expected wealth the solid line (read against the righthand vertical axis)
and expected gains the dashed line (read against the lefthand vertical axis). Two
features merit particular attention. First, the probability that a recipient's herd
size will reach the high-level asset equilibrium (more than 30 cattle) is S-shaped,
with values less than 1% below 7 head and reaching a plateau in the 35-45% range
beginning roughly at 22 head. Second, that initial herd size interval of 7-22 cattle
{ the neighborhood of the threshold at which wealth dynamics bifurcate { is the
only asset range over which expected gains exceed the 1 cattle transfer.15
14Other herd sizes (10, 15, 20, 25, 35) lead to similar conclusions. We also
experimented with the change in the probability of having a herd size above 30
due to the transfer of one animal. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones
discussed below.
15Because our simulation procedure only considers initial herd sizes between 1
and 60 cattle, we face a problem in assigning values to these variables outside of
that interval. We chose not to assign any values to these variables when herd
size in 2003 is bigger than 60 given that we only lose 9 of 463 observations and
the degree of arbitrariness in that decision would be unacceptable. The decision
on what values to assign to the case when the match has no cattle is much more
straightforward. For expected wealth, we assumed that Pr(herd size10 years ahead
¸ 30j match has no cattle, gift of 1 cattle)= Pr(herd size10 years ahead ¸ 30 j
match has 1 cattle) = 0. For expected gains, we assumed that (expected herd size
after 10 years j match has no cattle, gift of 1 cattle) = (expected herd size 10 years96










































Figure 4.2: Expected consequences of a loan of 1 cattle
The elements of the X{vector { clan membership, gender, age, land holdings,
and household size { are expressed not as the Euclidean distance between the
pair but rather using a measure of distance that allows for ordinal di®erences in
the relative position of the respondent and match to play a role in explaining the
respondent's decision. To be more concrete, consider the case of a categorical vari-
able such as gender. If the match and respondent share the same gender we can
either control for a dummy variable \same gender" - implicitly imposing that the
e®ect of a female{female match is the same as that of a male{male one { or we can
consider the set of all possible matches (female{female, female{male, male{female
ahead j match has 1 cattle) = 1.612, and that, in case they receive no gift, 10 years
ahead their herd size will remain 0.97
and male{male) and incorporate a dummy variable for each speci¯c combination.
Mutatis mutandis, the same reasoning applies to continuous variables.16This ap-
proach o®ers an intuitively more appealing interpretation of the e®ects of social
and economic distance than the more conventional Euclidean measure of social
distance that (implicitly) imposes symmetry in the e®ect of these variables upon
the dyad formation decision.
One alternative way of modeling the error term is to assume that,
E("ih;"jh) 6= 0 if i 6= j (4.8)
that is, to incorporate the e®ect of matches' unobserved heterogeneity on the link
formation decision. Just as we assume in equation 4.6 that (unobserved) lender's
capacity do resist demands on his/her assets may drive observed credit access de-
cisions, it may be reasonable to think that (unobserved) borrower's persistence or
trustworthiness might play a role in the pattern of answers that we analyze. Both
Udry and Conley (2005) and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) correct the covari-
ance matrices of their estimates for the possible e®ect of matches' unobservables,
using Conley (1999) estimator. Neither study ¯nds large di®erences due to this
correction.17
We follow a di®erent strategy for addressing the possibility re°ected in equa-
tion 4.8, using a nonparametric permutation test known as Quadratic Assignment
Procedure (QAP) (Hubert and Schultz, 1976, Krackhardt, 1987, 1988) to obtain
correct p{values. The basic intuition behind this procedure is that the permuta-
tion of the data on the dependent variable must maintain its clustered nature. In
16With a di®erent formalization, the same idea is captured in Fafchamps and
Gubert (2007).
17Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) mention that their Monte Carlo simulations
support the importance given to this issue, as corrected standard errors can be
much larger than uncorrected ones.98
practice, this means that the same permutation must be applied to respondents
and matches. We can then estimate the above model when all correlation between
dependent and independent variables is broken through resampling { that is, when
the null hypothesis that all slopes equal zero is known to be true { and compare our
¯rst estimates with their empirical distribution obtained through the repetition of
this exercise (in our case, 200 times), to generate a sampling distribution for the
parameter estimates. Contrary to previous studies, we ¯nd that this added control
for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals indeed matters to our results with
respect to the formation of credit networks. For that reason, and although we'll
present both uncorrected and QAP{corrected p{values, we'll focus the discussion
on the last, more general results.
4.3.3 Estimation results
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of the regressors used in the regressions we
now discuss.
Table 4.2: Variable de¯nitions and descriptive statistics
Variable De¯nition Mean
(SD)
EWj (Expected Probability that the mach will have a herd bigger 6.5
Wealth) than 30 cattle, 10 years after receiving a loan of one (0.10)
cattle, given current (2003) herd size
EGj (Expected Di®erence in match's expected herd size, 10 years 1.063
Gains) after receiving a loan of one cattle, given current (0.327)
(2003) herd size
Lj (Loss) Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the match lost cattle 0.21
in the period between September 2000 and (0.40)
September 2003
Match has no Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the match has no cattle 0.15
cattle in September 2003 (0.36)
Continued on next page...99
... table 4.2 (continued)
Variable De¯nition Mean
(SD)
Physical Absolute value of the distance between respondent 37.07
distance and match, in kilometers (55.78)
Same clan Dummy variable, equal to 1 if both respondent and 0.190
match belong to the same clan (0.39)
Both male Dummy variable, equal to 1 if both respondent and 0.41
match are male (0.49)
Male, female Dummy variable, equal to 1 if respondent is male 0.24
and the match is female (0.43)
Female, male Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the respondent is 0.22
female and the match is male (0.41)
Older Absolute value of the age di®erence between 8.48
respondent and match if the respondent is older (12.92)
than the match, 0 otherwise
Younger Absolute value of the age di®erence between 8.18
respondent and match if the respondent is younger (12.91)
than the match, 0 otherwise
More land Absolute value of the di®erence in land cropped be{ 0.39
tween the respondent and match if the respondent (1.27)
cultivates more land than the match, 0 otherwise
Less land Absolute value of the di®erence in land cropped be{ 0.37
tween the respondent and match if the respondent (1.11)
has less land than the match, 0 otherwise
Bigger family Absolute value of the di®erence in family size (in 1.59
persons) between the respondent and the match if (2.40)
the respondent has a bigger family than the match,
0 otherwise
Smaller family Absolute value of the di®erence in family size (in 1.66
persons) between the respondent and the match if (2.50)
the respondent has a smaller family than the match,
0 otherwise
Positive Absolute value of the correlation in asset levels, be{ 0.26
correlation tween the respondent and the match, if the corre{ (0.29)
lation is positive, 0 otherwise
Negative Absolute value of the correlation in asset levels, be{ 0.12
correlation tween the respondent and the match,if the corre{ (0.21)
lation is negative, 0 otherwise
Number of Number of brothers of the respondent 3.04
brothers (2.08)
Continued on next page...100
... table 4.2 (continued)
Variable De¯nition Mean
(SD)
No cattle since Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the match has no 0.04
2000 cattle since 2000 (0.20)
Poor since 2000 Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the match manages 0.05
a herd size that is smaller than 5 cattle (but strictly (0.21)
positive) since 2000
Not poor but Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the match has a herd 0.22
below threshold, of intermediate size but below the threshold (i.e., (0.41)
since 2000 between 5 and 14 cattle) since 2000
Above thresh{ Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the match has a herd 0.01
old, not wealthy, of intermediate size but above the threshold (i.e., (0.09)
since 2000 between 15 and 39 cattle) since 2000
Wealthy since Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the match manages 0.01
2000 a herd that is larger than 40 cattle since 2000 (0.11)
Table 4.3 then reports the estimates of the random e®ects logit regression when
the dependent variable is the decision to lend cattle to the match if he/she requests
a loan. Before we discuss the e®ects of our core covariates of interest { the respon-
dent's expected wealth and expected herd growth { let us ¯rst note a few results
with respect to the X variables, de¯ning relational characteristics between i andj.
These results re°ect possible frictions and associated costs of establishing a credit
relation, analogous to the e®ect of physical distance in driving localized insurance
Murgai et al. (2002).
The propensity to lend cattle is strongly and positively in°uenced by belonging
to the same clan, which may re°ect closer a±nity or, less altruistically, the interest
in keeping one's \strength in numbers" when competing with individuals from
other clans for the control of natural resources (especially water in this setting).
Variables that measure social distance in terms of gender are clearly asymmetric.
Men are more willing to lend cattle (either to women or to other men) than are101
Table 4.3: Logit estimates of loan giving patterns
Variable Coe±cient p-value QAP
p-value
Lj=0 £ Wj=0 2.038 0.071 0.035
Lj=0 £ EWj 0.031 0.076 0.055
Lj=0 £ EGj 0.313 0.569 0.275
Lj=1 £ Wj=0 -2.340 0.129 0.070
Lj=1 £ EWj -0.206 0.153 0.175
Lj=1 £ EGj 2.006 0.084 0.055
Respondent's wealth 0.030 0.176 0.065
Physical distance 0.001 0.691 0.255
Same clan 3.506 0.000 0.000
Both male 1.172 0.174 0.050
Respondent is male, match is female 1.187 0.172 0.035
Respondent is female, match is male 0.514 0.514 0.145
Respondent is older than match 0.009 0.609 0.145
Respondent is younger than match 0.010 0.543 0.085
Respondent has more land than match -0.144 0.563 0.440
Respondent has less land than match -0.140 0.607 0.305
Respondent has a bigger family than match -0.211 0.048 0.085
Respondent has a smaller family than match -0.243 0.025 0.030
Note: Village{speci¯c dummies and a constant were included in the estimation
but are not reported. Wj=0: Match has no cattle. Lj=0: Match did not loose
wealth in the period 2000/03. Lj=1: Match lost wealth in the period 2000/03.
EWj : Match's expected wealth. EGj : Match's expected gains from a loan
women. Respondents are slightly, but statistically signi¯cantly, more willing to
lend cattle to matches' who are older than themselves. Di®erences in household
size decrease the probability of a loan, signaling a propesnity to establish links with
those in a similar stage of the life{cycle. Physical proximity has no statistically
signi¯cant e®ect on credit access patterns in these data, as is perhaps unsurprising
among a population that has mobility at the center of its livelihood. Finally, we
notice that Ho® (1997) suggestion that wealthier givers would be less interested
in entering into such contracts does not seem to ¯nd support in these data. The
probability of extending an informal loan is modestly increasing in respondent's102
wealth.
We now turn to the core hypotheses of interest: the relation between credit
access and the match's wealth and shocks, holding the respondents' wealth con-
stant. The ¯rst point to notice is that our estimates are generally imprecise: after
controlling for the e®ect of unobserved heterogeneity across individuals, only hav-
ing no cattle and having su®ered no loss since 2000 is statistically signi¯cant at
the conventional ¯ve percent signi¯cance level, although a few other variables are
signi¯cant at the ten percent level.
Second, having su®ered losses in the recent past (that is, the period 2000/03,
for which we have data) seems to be important in de¯ning the selection criteria
of who is creditworthy. Expected gains are important (with a p{value of 0.055)
when the borrower lost cattle, while only expected wealth matters (likewise with
a p{value of 0.055) for the sub{sample of those who su®ered no loss in the recent
past.
The identi¯cation of the e®ect of a prospective borrower's wealth on the prob-
ability of being given credit requires us to take into account the combined e®ect
of three variables { expected wealth, expected gains and a dummy that accounts
for possible discontinuities due to the fact that the borrower has no wealth. This
combined e®ect is graphed in Figure 4.3 for the \average link" (that is, one char-
acterized by the average value of all other variables), taking into consideration the
di®erences between those who su®ered a loss and those who did not.
Credit seems to respond to losses only for those herders who, having cattle, are
not \too poor", that is, those with wealth in the neighborhood of 7-10 animals,
while those with wealth above 15 animals receive no loans in response to shocks.
Recall that the unstable equilibrium is in the neighborhood of 12{16 animals.103

























































Figure 4.3: Probability of establishing a credit link: the e®ect of match's wealth
This suggests that asset transfers may insure the permanent component of income
generation (that is, a wealth level that allows them to remain mobile herders
able to grow toward the higher herd size equilibrium), rather than the transitory
component. Given our earlier discussion, this appears a direct consequence of how
gains from informal credit are shared, creating an incentive for lenders to extend
credit to prospective borrowers in the neighborhood of the threshold at which
wealth dynamics bifurcate. The social convention behind informal lending in this
setting seems evolved to provide an e®ective safety net against collapse into the
pastoral poverty trap.
Those herders who did not su®er losses in the recent past seem to be evaluated
under di®erent criteria: expected capacity to repay seems to matter most and104
wealthier herders are preferred borrowers. Here again a wealth level of 15 animals
seems to play a role: above this value, the probability of receiving credit does not
seem to change much, signaling that all herders above the accumulation threshold
seem to be seen as equally desirable/viable, but those with smaller (but non-zero)
herd sizes are signi¯cantly less likely to receive a loan if they have not su®ered a
loss.
Finally, those herders who were destitute at the time of our survey had a
higher probability of receiving cattle as credit, possibly re°ecting the fact that,
as with gifts, there is room here for altruism, generating the sharp nonlinearities
in the transfer function identi¯ed by other authors (Cox, 1987, Cox, Hansen, and
Jimenez, 2004). This seems to contradict the historical record, which underscores
that cutting o® the destitute has traditionally been a standard response to dire
poverty among East African pastoralists (Illife, 1987, Anderson and Broch-Due,
1999). In section 4.4 we revisit this point and show that the exclusionary behavior
identi¯ed by anthropologists and historians may occur at another level, that of
social networks from which credit networks are activated. Conditional on having
established social ties, extreme destitution, in the form of stocklessness, appears to
induce the highest probability of receiving a loan when the prospective borrower
has not experienced a shock, suggesting some space for altruism in informal lending
patterns among the Boran.
One must notice see also that the expected probability of giving credit is never
above 0.5: in other words, under no conditions is the \average link" expected to
correspond to a situation where the lender e®ectively gives credit to the borrower.
Of course, the average link is an abstraction and, given the estimates from Table
4.3, a good candidate to insert some realism into the analysis of the kind of links105
that lead to credit being given is to look at links between individuals belonging to
the same clan. The results are graphed in ¯gure 4.4 and can be quickly summarized:
credit, now restricted to the situation when both lender and borrower are from the
same clan, does not seem to be given to those who didn't loose wealth in the recent
past unless they are destitute (that is, with no cattle), while credit within members
of the same clan may function as insurance only for those that are not \too poor"
{ in practice, with wealth below 11 animals.
One must note also that the expected probability of giving credit never ex-
ceeds 0.5. In other words, under no conditions is the \average link" expected to
correspond to a situation in which the prospective lender extends credit to the bor-
rower. Of course, the average link is an abstraction. Given the estimates reported
in Table 4.3, a good candidate scenario for increased realism is to look at links be-
tween individuals belonging to the same clan. Those results are graphed in ¯gure
4.4. Now restricted to prospective intra{clan lending, the basic pattern of limited
credit access in the absence of recent asset losses remains. The destitute enjoy a
high probability (greater than 0.8) of receiving an informal loan { reinforcing the
impression of altruistic lending to the very poorest { and those with non{zero herd
sizes have little prospect for receiving a loan although that probability is increas-
ing in wealth up to the wealth threshold, beyond which it is e®ectively constant at
0.20-0.25. Intra{clan credit responds robustly to shocks as de facto insurance only
for those who are not \too poor" { with wealth of 6{12 cattle { and not at all to
shocks for those with herd sizes beyond the critical wealth threshold. The strength
of the safety net mechanism remains even within clans, reinforcing the sense that
informal lending is directed chie°y toward those who will gain the most from the
loan because it tips them into the more desirable basin of attraction, toward the106















































































Figure 4.4: Probability of establishing a credit link: the e®ect of match's wealth
and clan membership
high-level herd size equilibrium.
4.3.4 The e®ect of borrower's ability
In section 4.2 we suggested the possibility that wealth dynamics may be character-
ized by club convergence as well as by multiple equilibria. Di®erences in herding
ability seem to a®ect expected herd dynamics; in particular lower ability herders
do not exhibit multiple equilibria and are expected to fall into the low{level equi-
librium regardless of the herd size with which they start. Transfers to low ability
herders are thus ine®ective insurance against the permanent e®ects of shocks irre-107
spective of ex post herd size. By contrast, higher ability herders exhibit multiple
stable equilibria and thus positive expected gains from a transfer when made to
a borrower in the neighborhood of the unstable equilibrium that appear to drive
informal credit patterns in the absence of controls for borrower herding ability.
Assuming herders rank the ability of their matches similarly to our estimates,
a match's ability should therefore matter to a respondent's likelihood of extend-
ing credit to a match if this behavior is indeed heavily in°uenced by borrowers'
expected long{run herd gains. This is e®ectively what we ¯nd in Table 4.4. As
Table 4.4: Logit estimates of loan giving patterns: the e®ect of herder's ability
Variable Coe±cient p-value QAP
p-value
Match is of low ability £ Lj=0 £ Wj=0 0.030 0.989 0.320
Match is of low ability £ Lj=0 £ EWj 0.033 0.272 0.150
Match is of low ability £ Lj=0 £ EGj 0.989 0.204 0.110
Match is of low ability £ Lj=1 £ Wj=0 -4.073 0.411 0.185
Match is of low ability £ Lj=1 £ EWj -14.180 1.000 0.045
Match is of low ability £ Lj=1 £ EGj 3.263 0.325 0.130
Match is of high ability £ Lj=0 £ Wj=0 2.496 0.070 0.020
Match is of high ability £ Lj=0 £ EWj 0.026 0.179 0.140
Match is of high ability £ Lj=0 £ EGj 0.242 0.675 0.320
Match is of high ability £ Lj=1 £ Wj=0 -2.963 0.086 0.050
Match is of high ability £ Lj=1 £ EWj -0.224 0.125 0.185
Match is of high ability £ Lj=1 £ EGj 2.370 0.050 0.020
Respondent's wealth 0.029 0.157 0.065
Note: Other covariates presented in table 4.3 were used in the estimation but
are not presented here.
a rule, low ability borrowers' wealth plays no statistically signi¯cant role in ex-
plaining the decision to give credit. This is true even when the borrower has no
cattle. Even seemingly altruistic lending behavior seems to discriminate between
those with low and higher ability, as the latter enjoy a sharply and statistically
signi¯cantly higher probability of receiving a loan when they have not su®ered a
recent loss. When our estimates are precise enough to guide some conclusion, as108
in the case of the variable \low ability £ loss £ expected wealth", the results do
not easily square with conventional models that focus on wealth as guarantee of
no default, as our estimate has the \wrong" sign. Credit does not function as
insurance to these wealthier herders, who are left to insure themselves. Those who
are expected to su®er the greater long-run herd declines (the wealthiest low ability
herders) are the least likely to receive informal loans.
On the other hand, the likelihood of granting an informal loan is sharply
and statistically signi¯cantly increasing in the borrower's expected herd gains for
herders of higher ability who lost wealth. They are the most credit worthy mem-
bers of the community. Introducing borrower ability thus reinforces the patterns
already observed: informal credit is concentrated overwhelmingly on those near
the threshold who have su®ered a wealth loss, thus serving as a safety net, and
on high ability destitute herders who have not su®ered a loss, signaling altruistic
transfers.
4.3.5 Alternative explanations of exclusion from credit con-
tract
Finally, we check whether our central results are robust to the inclusion of addi-
tional controls suggested by the alternative models identi¯ed at the close of the
section 4.3. We already addressed the concerns of Ho® (1997) and Murgai et al.
(2002) in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. In Table 4.5 we include, as additional controls, the
correlation between asset levels of our respondents and their random matches in
the nine survey rounds for which we have data. As with other covariates, we allow
for the possibility of di®erent e®ects upon the propensity to transfer cattle as a
loan depending on whether this correlation is positive or negative.109
Table 4.5: Logit estimates of loan giving patterns: the e®ect of correlation in
wealth dynamics
Variable Coe±cient p-value QAP
p-value
Match is of low ability £ Lj=0 £ Wj=0 -4.749 0.305 0.500
Match is of low ability £ Lj=0 £ EWj 0.008 0.854 0.130
Match is of low ability £ Lj=0 £ EGj 1.769 0.171 0.050
Match is of low ability £ Lj=1 £ Wj=0 -21.732 0.280 0.035
Match is of low ability £ Lj=1 £ EWj -32.236 1.000 0.040
Match is of low ability £ Lj=1 £ EGj 6.354 0.269 0.040
Match is of high ability £ Lj=0 £ EWj 0.028 0.139 0.045
Match is of high ability £ Lj=0 £ EGj 0.137 0.799 0.410
Match is of high ability £ Lj=1 £ Wj=0 -5.721 0.064 0.000
Match is of high ability £ Lj=1 £ EWj -0.324 0.105 0.100
Match is of high ability £ Lj=1 £ EGj 2.660 0.042 0.015
Respondent's wealth 0.027 0.177 0.170
Negative correlation in wealth -0.517 0.635 0.175
Positive correlation in wealth 1.466 0.065 0.245
Note: Other covariates presented in table 4.3 were used in the estimation but
are not presented here. \Match is of high ability £ Lj=1 £ Wj=0" was
dropped due to multicollinearity.
Although these additional controls are not statistically signi¯cant, their in-
clusion does change our results in one important way. It is no longer true that
belonging to the low ability category leads to being excluded from these credit
networks, signaling that either matches' ability is not correctly understood by our
respondents or that our own classi¯cation is somewhat °awed. The likelihood of
lending is now statistically signi¯cantly increasing in the expected gains from the
transfer even for low ability herders who have su®ered a loss. Hence, one of our
core results remains: informal lending appears concentrated around the unstable
wealth equilibrium in response to asset shocks, serving as a safety net against
collapse into a poverty trap.
This is likewise true when we include the respondent's number of brothers and
its square as a proxy for the size of the ex ante insurance network (Table 4.6).110
But just as when we control for correlation in wealth between respondent and
match, we now ¯nd that expected gains from a transfer post-shock appear to drive
informal lending irrespective of the borrower's herding ability.
Table 4.6: Logit estimates of loan giving patterns: the e®ect of ex ante credit
networks
Variable Coe±cient p-value QAP
p-value
Match is of low ability £ Lj=0 £ Wj=0 -5.539 0.230 0.510
Match is of low ability £ Lj=0 £ EWj 0.001 0.973 0.435
Match is of low ability £ Lj=0 £ EGj 2.019 0.125 0.065
Match is of low ability £ Lj=1 £ Wj=0 -24.201 0.263 0.030
Match is of low ability £ Lj=1 £ EWj -31.701 1.000 0.040
Match is of low ability £ Lj=1 £ EGj 7.052 0.253 0.030
Match is of high ability £ Lj=0 £ Wj=0 2.500 0.134 0.000
Match is of high ability £ Lj=0 £ EWj 0.028 0.157 0.470
Match is of high ability £ Lj=0 £ EGj 0.233 0.674 0.390
Match is of high ability £ Lj=1 £ Wj=0 -5.197 0.104 0.065
Match is of high ability £ Lj=1 £ EWj -0.313 0.116 0.325
Match is of high ability £ Lj=1 £ EGj 2.434 0.068 0.000
Respondent's wealth 0.027 0.159 0.475
Number of brothers -0.437 0.340 0.000
Number of brothers squared 0.063 0.256 0.080
Note: Other covariates presented in table 4.3 were used in the estimation but
are not presented here.
4.4 Nonlinear wealth dynamics and social exclusion
The fact that the poorest members of the community are less likely to receive
transfers than those near the accumulation threshold suggests a process of social
exclusion. If, as Santos and Barrett (2006) claim, multiple dynamic equilibria
arise because of asset shocks, then insurance against asset shocks is critical to
maintaining a viable livelihood for those of medium and high herding ability. Yet
if the asset poor cannot get transfers, either as gifts or as transfers, their ability111
to climb out of poverty is negligible. The results reported in the preceding section
may even understate this e®ect because they are based only on credit decisions
relating to the subsample of random matches with whom respondents were already
acquainted. Given that social acquaintance seems to precede the establishment of
a credit network, as shown in table 4.1, this section explores the possibility of
wealth{dependent \social invisibility", which could reinforce the credit rationing
mechanism identi¯ed in the previous section.
Table 4.7: Logit estimates of social acquaintance networks
Variable Coe±cient p-value QAP
p-value
Match is destitute since 2000 -1.106 0.025 0.070
Match has less than 5 cattle since 2000 -0.145 0.736 0.391
Match has between 5 and 14 cattle since 2000 -0.127 0.639 0.379
Match has between 15 and 39 cattle since 2000 -0.581 0.558 0.485
Match has more than 39 cattle since 2000 -1.297 0.287 0.284
Match lost cattle since 2000 0.203 0.466 0.356
Respondent has more cattle than match -0.014 0.009 0.096
Respondent has less cattle than match 0.040 0.001 0.043
Distance -0.007 0.323 0.201
Same clan 0.743 0.015 0.033
Both male 0.684 0.081 0.118
Respondent is male, match is female 0.177 0.671 0.359
Respondent is female, match is male 0.618 0.084 0.121
Respondent is older than match -0.026 0.013 0.005
Respondent is younger than match -0.000 0.971 0.515
Respondent has more land than match 0.143 0.215 0.193
Respondent has less land than match 0.482 0.001 0.013
Respondent has a bigger family than match 0.042 0.499 0.264
Respondent has a smaller family than match -0.097 0.088 0.111
Note: Village{speci¯c dummies and a constant were included in the estimation
but are not reported here. Being from Qorate predicts being known perfectly {
the variable was dropped and 300 observations were not used.
We use the same logit estimation approach from equation 4.5 to examine pat-
terns of social acquaintance among the individuals in our sample, now using the112
\know" variable from table 4.1 as the dependent variable. Because this variable is
certainly the result of past processes, we incorporate the e®ect of past dynamics
(in practice, herd size transitions between 2000 and 2003) and not the variables
that we previously interpreted as a measure of future herd size or expected gains
from a loan. The results are presented in table 4.7.
Being from the same clan and having less assets (cattle and land) than one's
match increases the probability of knowing the random match, while having more
cattle and being older have a negative impact, a clear demonstration of the asym-
metric e®ects of wealth and status on the structure of social networks. This e®ect
is even clearer when we consider the e®ect of a match being destitute, i.e., having
no cattle. Destitution is strongly associated with exclusion from social networks,
as re°ected in a large, negative, and statistically signi¯cant coe±cient estimate. A
herd size consistently at the low{level equilibrium appears associated with greater
likelihood of social invisibility that, recall from Table 4.1, seems to prevent one
from entering into dyadic credit relationships. Informal credit arrangements can-
not function for the poorest members of a society if they are not part of the social
networks from which credit networks are drawn.
The nature of the channels through which this process operates are not entirely
clear, although the anthropological literature on the Boran o®ers some suggestions.
Dahl (1979), for example, mentions that the participation in the social and political
life of the Boran is hardly compatible with the daily management of the herd:
wealthy herders, who usually occupy these traditional (and highly visible) o±ces,
quite often delegate these tasks to someone else. Lybbert et al. (2004) hypothesize
that multiple herd size equilibria result from the involuntary sedentarization of the
destitute while those with viable herds migrate. Seasonal migration might thereby113
create su±cient physical separation and di®erences in lifestyle that the poorest
become invisible to those who remain as herders. Regardless of the precise causal
mechanisms by which the greater social invisibility of the poor arises, what seems
clear from historical accounts is that exclusion generated by persistent poverty is
not something new. For example, Illife (1987, p.42) notes that \[t]o be poor is one
thing, but to be destitute is quite another, since it means the person so judged
is outside the normal network of social relations and is consequently without the
possibility of successful membership in ongoing groups, the members of which can
help him if he requires it. The Kanuri [in the West African savannah] say that
such a person is not to be trusted". Closer to our study site, a Somali proverb
states that \Prolonged sickness and persistent poverty cause people to hate you"
(World Bank, 2000, p.16).
We should note, however, that the evidence that we ¯nd for the importance of
social invisibility in this environment is weakened once we use the QAP to obtain
correct p{values for the variables in our model. In particular, persistently having
no cattle is no longer signi¯cant at the 5% level (although the p{value increases
only to 0.07) and the asymmetries in the e®ects of di®erence in wealth become less
precisely estimated. There are two possible explanations for this. First, knowing
one's match may be a less \rational" process than is choosing a loan recipient,
leading to a greater role for unobserved heterogeneity for both respondent and
match. Second, even if we are using all the relevant variables to eliminate the
two{way unobserved heterogeneity concern, we only observe them for a relatively
short period and there can be no presumption that the process from destitution to
social invisibility takes e®ect immediately. For example, moving to a larger urban
center as a consequence of utter destitution is not quickly or easily undertaken.114
This raises the theoretically and empirically interesting question of describing the
dynamics of these networks, a topic that unfortunately we cannot address with
these data.
4.5 Conclusions and policy implications
This paper presented a simple conceptual model of the implications of multiple
wealth equilibria for patterns of informal credit and established that data from a
population among which poverty traps have been previously identi¯ed support the
hypothesis that informal credit conforms to this model. Livestock loans among
these herders appear to function largely as safety nets, triggered by herd losses so
long as those losses leave the prospective transfer recipient not "too poor" so that
the expected gains to the borrower from the loan { and thus to the lender { are
relatively high, as compared to loans to poorer or richer prospective borrowers.
For the poorest, stockless herders, their destitution induces prospective partners
to rationally exclude them from credit{cum{insurance networks, even though they
know each other, although informal credit does °ow to the destitute altruistically,
especially between members of the same clan.
This e®ect of credit rationing that leaves out poorer (if not necessarily the
poorest) members of the community is compounded by the fact that the poor
are less socially visible than their somewhat wealthier neighbors. Because being
known is, in our sample, a necessary condition for receiving transfers, the greater
social invisibility of the destitute compounds their rational exclusion from informal
¯nancial transactions e®ected through social networks, leaving them vulnerable to
shocks and largely without credit networks to fall back on in times of need.
The existence of multiple wealth equilibria and the focal role played by the115
dynamic wealth threshold that we identify in this setting have profound implica-
tions for public policies to address problems of persistent poverty and asset loss
in a setting characterized by poverty traps. Because transfers can have, literally,
life or death consequences in contexts such as the rangelands of southern Ethiopia,
it is perhaps unwise to derive conclusions about optimal redistributive policies
simply from our econometric results (Cohen-Cole, Durlauf, and Rondina, 2005).
Nevertheless, our results speak to the concern that external transfers from gov-
ernments, donors or international nongovernmental organizations may crowd out
existing informal arrangements. Boran pastoralists seem to act in such a way that
clearly marginalizes those who are trapped in dire poverty. In this context, wor-
ries about the crowding out e®ect of public interventions seem misplaced, as the
poorer members are clearly left uninsured with distressingly high probability. In
fact, our empirical results suggest that, up to some wealth level, public transfers
may even lead to the crowding-in of private transfers, as a recent analysis of private
transfers in the Philippines likewise suggests (Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez, 2004).
This result is no surprise in a context where transfers are risk-sharing mechanisms
motivated by exchange/reciprocity considerations, in which case there may be a
positive correlation between the welfare of the recipient and a private transfer be-
cause better-o® recipients will be better placed to reciprocate a transfer in the
future.Appendix A
Regression tree analysis
This Appendix describes the construction of a regression tree using Generalized,
Unbiased, Interaction Detection and Estimation (GUIDE). Loh (2002) is the cen-
tral reference, while Loh (2007) explains how to use the program and how to inter-
pret the output. The program is freely downloadable from www.stat.wisc.edu/ loh/.
We start by considering four categories of variables, as a function of their type
(numerical(N)/ categorical(C)) and their role in the model (¯t the model(F)/ split
the tree(S)/ both):
Fit Split Fit + Split
Numerical F S N
Categorical F C N
The algorithm proceeds in three steps: 1) choice of the splitting variable at
each node of the tree; 2) choice of the splitting value and ¯nally, 3) cost{complexity
pruning. Steps 1) and 2) construct two mutually exclusive subsets at each node,
starting with the set of all observations and stopping when the number of ob-
servations in the subsets falls below a predetermined (chosen) value. To avoid
over{¯tting the data, the tree is pruned back using a cost{complexity algorithm.
The choice of the split variable proceeds as follows:
1) obtain the residuals from the regression on the N and F variables;
2) for each numerical variables used to split the sample (either S or N), divide the
data into 4 groups at the sample quartiles; construct a 2 £ 4 contingency table
with the signs of the residuals (positive/ non-positive) as rows and the groups as
columns; count the number of observations in each cell and compute the Â2 statis-
tic and its p{value from the Â2
3 distribution;
3) do the same for each categorical variable used to split the sample (either C or
N), taking the categories of the variable as the columns; omit those columns with
zero column totals;
4) to detect interactions:
4.1) between pairs of variables, divide the space formed by them into 4 quadrants
by splitting each in two at the sample median; construct a 2£4 contingency table
(with residuals as rows and each quadrant as columns); compute the Â2 statistic
and its p{value;
4.2) do the same for each S variable;
4.3) use the value pairs of the C variables to divide the sample space; construct
a 2£(c1£c2) contingency table, where c1 and c2 are the number of unique values
of each variable; compute the Â2 statistic and its p{value, omitting those columns
with zero column totals;
4.4) compute the Â2 statistic and its p{value for each pair (N,C) from a contin-
gency table with 2£(2£c1) dimensions, omitting those columns with zero column
totals;
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4.5) do the same for each pair (S, C);
4.6) do the same for each pair (S, N), following 4.4);
5) if the smallest p{value comes from one of the sets generated by steps 2) or 3),
the associated variable is selected to split the node;
6) if the smallest p{value comes from one of the sets generated by step 4), then
use the following rules to select which, from among the interaction variables, is the
splitting variable:
6.1)if only one of these variables is a N{variable, choose the other one;
6.2) if neither is a N{variable, choose the one with the smallest p-value, as com-
puted from step 3);
6.3) if both are N{variables, split the node along the sample mean of each variable
and choose the variable whose split yields the smaller total SSE.
After this step, the split value for that variable has to be determined. This is
done using the next algorithm:
1) de¯ne the partitions P1(v) and P2(v) as:
P1(v) = f(y,X) j xj · v g
P2(v) = f(y, X) j xj > v g
where xj 2 Xj and Xj is the chosen split variable;
2) regress y on X separately for each partition and obtain the residuals of these
regressions (r1 and r2, respectively);
3) choose v to be the value of the split variable that minimizes the sum of squared
residuals:
1/n1 £ r2
1 + 1/n2 £ r2
2
where n1 and n2 are the number of observations in each partition.
Finally, once the most extensive tree is constructed, the algorithm \prunes" it
to avoid over{¯tting the data. This is done using cost{complexity pruning, where






(xi;yi)2n (yi-¯nxi)2 + ®£ b
where ® is the penalty parameter (0 · ® · 1) and Tb represents a tree with b
nodes. The objective of the algorithm is to identify the tree that minimizes C®.
It proceeds in two steps: the construction of the optimal tree for each value of ®
(denote it by T¤(®)) and the choice of the optimal ® (denote it by ®¤). Denote by
T0 the tree originated when splits were costless (that is, ® = 0).
1) Start with T0 and increase ®.
2) Remove any terminal splits in T0 whose elimination reduces the value of equa-
tion (A.1), producing a new tree. This is done by merging the observations in
these terminal nodes in a new terminal node.
3) Increase ® by a chosen increment.
4) Repeat Steps 2) and 3) until the nodes of tree have a unique element (by analogy
with our previous notation, denote the resulting tree by T1).
5) For each T¤(®), produce a V-fold cross validated estimate of the squared sum
of residuals (SSR) in equation (A.1).
6) Choose T¤(®) that minimizes the SSR.118
Breiman et al. (1984) show that each of the trees in the (¯nite) sequence be-
tween T0 and T1 is unique and it must contain T¤(®). The concept of V-fold
cross-validation is explained in detail in Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2001,
section 7.10).Appendix B
Monte Carlo simulation code
This is the main structure of the Stata code used to generate the results presented
in Table 3.8. Its use requires small adaptations and extensions (to get di®erent







replace clan=1 if clan·0.20
replace clan=2 if clan·0.2333
replace clan=3 if clan·0.30
replace clan=4 if clan·0.40
replace clan=5 if clan·0.7667
replace clan=6 if clan·0.90
replace clan=7 if clan·0.9667
replace clan=8 if clan·1.00
set seed 12345
gensex=uniform()
replace sex=1 if sex·0.633






replace hhsize=1 if hhsize·0
set seed 12345
genexp=invnorm(uniform())
replace exp=(exp*14.94) + 23.2
replace exp=int(exp)













replace cat1=ln(a) + sqrt(ln(b))*cat1 if ind·0.90
replace cat1=0 if ind>0.90
set seed 12345
gen cat2=invnorm(uniform())
replace cat2=67.333+37.647*cat2 if ind>0.90121
replace cat2=0 if ind·0.90
gen cattle=cat1 + cat2
replace cattle=0 if cattle<0
replace cattle=int(cattle)

















replace match=[ n] if [ n]·200
forvalues x = 2 (1) 200f








foreach var in exp land cattle hhsize f
gen m`var'=`var'-`var'1
replace m`var'=0 if `var'<`var'1
gen l`var'=abs(`var'-`var'1)
replace l`var'=0 if `var'>`var'1
g














gen link=1.206*sclan + .071*ssex - .029*msize +.007*lsize +.335*mland
- .024*lland - .071*mcattle -.001*lcattle - .001*mexp -.008*lexp
replace link=0 if name==match
replace link=(link>0)





by name, sort: gen slink=sum(link)
replace link=0 if slink>10
logit link sclan ssex mexp lexp land lland mcattle lcattle mhhsize lhhsize
save \...\villageSL.dta", replace








































logit link sclan ssex mhhsize lhhsize mland lland mcattle lcattle mexp
lexp














/*this program has to be repeated for the remaining sampling ratios (50%, 66%,
90%) and for the remaining models of network formation*/








merge N using `structure R66RSI'
drop merge
save, replace
foreach var in testR33RSI testR50RSI testR66RSI testR90RSI f
count if `var'>.05 & `var'!=.
g
/* Simulating the RANDOM MATCHING approach when links are randomly
formed*/











































logit link sclan ssex mhhsize lhhsize mland lland mcattle lcattle mexp
lexp








simulate \networkstructure" testR33RSR5=r(test), reps(100) saving
(\`structure R33RSR5'")
program drop networkstructure
/* this simulation has to be repeated for the remaining sampling ratios, di®erent
models of network formation and number of relations to be sampled (10 and 15)*/BIBLIOGRAPHY
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